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About the COVID-19 Response and Recovery project 
 
This paper is an output from the project 
financial resources for development in the time of COVID- which is co-ordinated 
by the Debt and Development Finance Branch of UNCTAD and jointly implemented 
with ECA, ECLAC and ESCAP. This project is one of the five UN Development 
Account short-term projects launched in May 2020 in response to the COVID-19 
crisis.  
 
The project aims to enable low-income and middle-income developing countries 
(LICs and MICs) from Africa, Asia-Pacific, and Latin America and the Caribbean to 
diagnose their macro-financial, fiscal, external financial and debt fragilities in the 
global context, and design appropriate and innovative policy responses to the 
COVID-19 pandemic leading toward recoveries aligned with the achievement of the 





In this report, we stress the importance of structural change and productive 
development as leading engines of post-Covid economic recovery. We do so by first 
putting emphasis on the perverse relation between underdeveloped productive 
structures and the intensity of the Covid-19 crisis. We then look at factors that may 
have harmed productive development in emerging and developing (EDE) countries  
over the last forty years. We investigate the role of (non-FDI) net capital inflows as a 
potential source of premature de-industrialization in a wide range of EDE countries, 
Latin American ones in particular, in the context of increasing financial integration. 
Our analysis intends to verify whether periods of abundant capital inflows to EDE 
economies may have fed perverse structural changes away from those sectors, 
namely manufacturing, traditionally recognized as prime sources of long-run 
development. We consider a sample of 36 countries from 1980 to 2017. We find that 
manufacturing employment and GDP shares tend to contract more substantially, and 
the economic complexity index decreases during episodes of financial bonanza. 
Given this evidence, we discuss policies that may support transformative post-Covid 
recovery. We first consider available space for expansionary fiscal policy and public 
investment-centered recovery plans as influenced by the degree of financial 
integration characterizing EDE countries. We then analyze whether macroprudential 
policies taming international capital mobility may bear positive effects for long-run 
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After more than one year since its outbreak, most economies worldwide are struggling to recover 
from the Covid-19 crisis. In 2020, the drop in world GDP has been steeper than what observed in 2009 
after the last financial crisis. It has been the deepest recession since the Great Depression, with global 
trade in goods and services estimated to have decreased by 7.6 percent (UN, 2021). Economic activity 
is expected to rebound in 2021, but enduring confinement measures and the scars from the 2020 
downturn may give rise to square-root shaped recovery and long-lasting stagnation. 
 
The Covid-19 crisis has taken different degrees of intensity in different regions. Among emerging and 
developing countries (EDE henceforth), economic dynamics slowed down but remained positive in 
East Asia and China. Latin America, instead, stands out as the most affected region of the World 
together with South Asia (UN, 2021). If we look at the sanitary aspects of the pandemic, whilst Latin 
America represents about 8% of world population in 2020, it accounts for roughly one-fourth of world 
Covid-19 infections and one-third of the total death toll (Allin et al., 2020). When it comes to the 
economy, Latin America’s GDP is estimated to have contracted by around 8.0 percent according to 
UN’s World Economic Situation and Prospects 2021 and IMF World Economic Outlook (IMF, October 
2020a). Such a decline is more than two times larger than that observed in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Economic recovery in Latin America is expected to languish around a mere 3-2 percent in the next 
three years, even lower than that attributed to advanced economies. 
 
There is not a unique factor that can explain the tremendously high toll paid by Latin America to Covid-
19. According to Aguilera (2020), Latin American countries are developing and emerging economies 
that nevertheless suffer from advanced economy-type diseases such as obesity and hypertension. On 
the one hand, such diseases tend to worsen the effects of the contagion and more likely turn infected 
people into intensive care. On the other hand, higher pressures on fragile healthcare systems can raise 
the death toll and, at the same time, induce local governments to more stringent and prolonged 
lockdown measures, with obvious harsh repercussions for the economy. The pandemic has led all 
governments worldwide to adopt discretionary fiscal measures in support of their economies. Latin 
American governments do not make an exception and have implemented fiscal packages broadly 
consistent with those of other EDE economies, although smaller than the fiscal response of advanced 
countries (see more on this below). Fiscal reaction, however, has been heterogenous among Latin 
America countries. Mexico, for instance, is a striking case of fiscal inactivism. According to the IMF’s 
Fiscal Monitor Report 2020 (IMF, 2020b), fiscal reaction to Covid-19 in Mexico amounts to a mere 2 
percent of GDP, so that Swarnali et al. (2020) suggest a fiscal twist by adopting more counter-cyclically 
measures now and postponing fiscal adjustments over the medium term. In 2019, the Mexican 
economy represented almost 27 percent of the whole Latin American GDP. It is easy to see how lack 
of counter-cyclical fiscal measures and a deepening crisis in Mexico could have perverse spill-over 
effects for the economy of the entire region. Perhaps more importantly for the sake of our analysis, 
there is some evidence that the negative medium-term economic implications of Covid-19 may 
become more acute in the context of fragile and relatively underdeveloped productive structures 
characterized by widespread informality, high inequality standards, large dependence on natural 
resources and/or contact-intensive services (Hevia and Neumeyer, 2020). This is the case of Latin 
American economies, even in comparative terms with respect to other EDE economies, so that Latin 
American may have turned out to be particularly exposed to the current shock. 
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The perverse relation between underdeveloped productive structures and the intensity of the current 
crisis puts structural change at the heart of any development strategy that aims at feeding recovery 
and increasing resilience to any similar shock in the future. In this report, we address this issue by 
looking at factors that may have harmed productive development in EDE countries over the last forty 
years. More specifically, we investigate the role of non-FDI capital flows as potential source of 
premature de-industrialization in EDE countries in the context of increasing financial integration in the 
world economy. In a way, our work intends to empirically test economic theories according to which 
periods of abundant capital inflows to EDE economies may have fed changes in domestic productive 
structures away from those sectors, namely manufacturing, traditionally recognized as prime sources 
of long-run sustainable development (Benigno and Fornaro, 2014; Botta, 2021).  
 
Our work takes into account a wide range of EDE countries. Nevertheless, special attention is 
dedicated to Latin America. Indeed, each section of this report will include a specific paragraph 
dedicated to the study of the six largest Latin American economies, i.e., Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Mexico and Peru. The structure of our work is as follows. Section 2 will provide a brief 
overview about how and why weak underdeveloped productive structures may have contributed to 
aggravate the economic implications of the pandemic. Section 3 will move to the core issue of this 
report, i.e., the link between structural change, productive development and financial integration. 
Finally, Section 4 will pay attention to the way forward and to policies that may support a 
transformative recovery in the context of a more resilient economy. More specifically, we will first 
consider available space for public investment-centered fiscal policies given the level of financial 
integration characterizing EDE countries and the constraints to fiscal expansions they had traditionally 
to deal with. We will then analyze whether macroprudential policies taming international capital 
mobility may also bear positive effects for the long-run productive development of EDE economies on 
top of their implications for (short-term) financial and macroeconomic stability. Section 5 will draw 
some final remarks. 
 
2. Productive development and economic resilience to 
Covid-19  
 
Various factors may contribute to deepen or soften the economic impact of the pandemic: the 
effectiveness of early confinement measures; the generosity of discretional fiscal stimuli; the speed 
of the vaccination campaign. Emerging empirical evidence suggests that different productive 
structures may also help to explain cross-country differences in the intensity of the crisis. There are at 
least three ways through which differences in productive structures may affect the economic 
vulnerability to Covid-19. They are related to (i) the quality of employment that different productive 
structures generate; (ii) the sector-specific exposure to Covid-related confinement measures; (iii) the 
more general dependence of an economy on specific productive “assets” (read natural resources), 
and the way the related sectors respond to global shocks.  
 
EDE countries usually present poorly diversified productive structures, at least in relative terms with 
respect to advanced economies. They lag behind the technological frontier and are characterized by 
a negative productive gap. The industrialization process if often incomplete as the capital good sector 
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is underdeveloped and backward and forward linkages are not adequately exploited. Following La 
Porta and Shleifer (2014), lack of productive development is generally mirrored in dual economic 
structures, where a large and seemingly permanent informal sector co-exists alongside a small formal 
economy1. Informality in low-middle income countries has become even more important in time of 
Covid-19 as it may be disproportionally affected by the economic consequences of the pandemic. First, 
small informal firms are characterized by shorter “surviving periods” than (relatively) larger formal 
companies and are more exposed to bankruptcy in the absence of revenues during lockdowns. This is 
due to the fact that small informal firms or self-employees usually accumulate less capital and cash 
reserves than formal companies and are more easily excluded from credit and financial markets due 
to the lack of valuable collaterals (Felipe Cespedes et al., 2020; Valensisi, 2020). Second, informal 
entrepreneurs or employees do not usually benefit of any form of insurance or social protection 
against unemployment and/or inability to work. This fact considerably increases the difficulties of 
national governments to cushion the economic effects of the pandemic since that they may have to 
create some universal social protection schemes from nihilo. On top of this, the lack of adequate social 
safety nets could make the contraction of family income particularly acute. Whilst this may not be 
captured by official statistics, it could equally show up in the form of sharp drops in domestic demand 
injections, private consumption first and foremost (see more on this below).  
 
Covid-19 is an economy-wide crisis that negatively affected almost all productive sectors. The crisis, 
however, did not hit homogenously all the industries. In general terms, the service industry seems to 
have been more severely affected than manufacturing and agriculture, although considerable 
heterogeneity exists even inside these three macro sectors2. According to ECLAC (2020), activities in 
the hospitality, transportation, tourism, retail trade, repair and, more broadly, commerce are those 
that suffer the most. On the one hand, this is due to the intrinsic nature of the services they offer, as 
they are “contact-intensive” services almost completely banned during lockdowns. On the other hand, 
firms in these sectors are characterized by considerably shorter “survival times” than manufacturing 
companies (Bosio et al., 2020). Economic systems that more heavily rely upon these industries may 
experience tougher economic contractions than other countries. 
 
The outbreak of the pandemic has also caused significant fluctuations in the price of primary 
commodities. The reaction has not been uniformed across sectors. Price indexes for agricultural 
products and metals did not decline so intensively as in the wake of the 2007-2008 financial crisis. The 
 
1  In the last three decades, following the original contribution by De Soto (1988), several economists have developed a more 
“positive” view of informality. According to this approach, in formality is seen as an open choice of economic actors in 
response to excessive regulation and bureaucratic costs of the formal economy that enable firms to be flexible and to avoid 
formal sector’s rigidities (Maloney, 2004). La Porta and Shleifer (2014) c ontrast this approach. They provide a comprehensive 
empirical description of informal businesses as far less productive, less profitable and producing lower quality goods than 
formal activities. The scope for innovation and investment is minimal, and there  is no real competition between informal 
and formal firms. Indeed, “informal entrepreneurs would gladly close their businesses to work as employees in the formal 
sector if offered the chance, even if wages in the formal sector are taxed while income in the  informal sector is not” (La Porta 
and Shleifer, 2014, p.112). In a way, La Porta and Shleifer defend a more traditional Lewis-type perspective of informality in 
which it is an unvoluntary feature of dualist economies due to lack of productive development and that may spontaneously 
shrink if and when countries develop and the formal economy expands. Following Loayza (2018), informality may be the 
result of both underdeveloped productive systems and inefficient governance depending on country -specific factors. The 
recognition of this last possibility does not make structural change and productive development less important for the 
absorption of informality. In this report, we will pay prevalent attention to how productive development, by squeezing 
informality, may increase economic resilience to Covid-19 and possible future pandemics.    
2  Following UN (2021), world trade in the automotive sector contracted massively in 2020. Trade in office machineries and 
communication equipment increased by around 10 percent, instead. 
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price of agricultural products has actually increased since January 2020. In the case of metals, after an 
initial modest reduction, it is now above its pre-crisis level. According to the World Bank Commodity 
Market Outlook (WB, October 2020a), however, the price index for the energy sector, oil in particular, 
decreased by almost 60 percent in the first quarter of 2020. It has partially rebounded thereafter, but 
remains about one-third lower than its pre-crisis level and it is expected to halve over the next two 
years. Heterogenous evolutions in the market for primary commodities may have led resource 
dependent economies to be less negatively affected than in previous global shocks. Nonetheless, the 
pandemic has demonstrated once more the potential exposure of some EDE countries to volatility in 
the price of primary commodities. The initial drop and subsequent volatility in the price of the energy 
sector seem to emphasize the quest for productive diversification in those economies that depend 
upon exports of oil and natural gas as primary source of foreign currency. In these countries, economy-
wide uncertainty may increase during times of high volatility in commodity prices. The external 
balance constraint may get significantly tighter when the price of exported commodities declines, 
leading economic growth to an abrupt halt3. This is even the more so since that international financial 
markets seem to offer these countries small space for protracted current account deficits (Vernengo 





Productive structures in Latin American countries seem to present some specific features that can 
make them more vulnerable to the economic consequences of the pandemic even in comparison to 
other EDE economies.  
 
First, Latin American countries present the highest informal sector’s GDP share among EDE economies 
together with Sub-Saharan Africa (see World Bank, 2019; Islam and Lapeyre, 2020).4 This fact may 
contribute to exacerbate the negative consequences of Covid-19. Official statistics cannot capture the 
full drop in informal sector’s output. Nonetheless, we can somehow infer the implicit and indirect 
economy-wide consequences of Covid-led contraction in informal income by looking at the dynamics 
in the different demand components of GDP. Indeed, it is reasonable to assume that Covid-related 
damages to informal employment may be somehow reflected in the relative behavior of private 
consumption vis-à-vis other demand components. Information about the components of real GDP in 
2020 are still largely missing, in particular for EDE countries. However, available data5 indicate that, in 
Latin America, the bulk of the drop in annual GDP is imputable to the contraction in domestic private 
consumption. In Chile and Argentina, private consumption contributed up to 85 and 94 percent of the 
overall reduction in domestic income, respectively6. Improvements in the trade balance, mainly due 
 
3  In external balance constrained economies, economic growth and capital accumulation strongly rely upon capital goods’ 
imports, which in turn depend on the availability of “hard currency” via exports. From a historical point of view, de clining 
and volatile terms of trade of “peripheral” countries versus “central” economies have recurrently forced the former to curtai l 
investment and slow down economic growth.     
4  This is not the case for the employment share, as informal sector’s employment share in Latin America is relatively smaller 
than in African, Asian or Arab countries (Islam and Lapeyre, 2020). This is due to the fact that informal activities in Latin  
America are relatively more productive than what observed in other parts of th e developing world.  
5  Available data about demand components of real GDP in 2019 and 2020 have been collected from OECD at 
https://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?queryid=60702.    
6  We computed the contribution of different demand components to the most recent evolution of real GDP according to 























 , where “Y” stands for real 
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to the collapse of imports, have partially counteracted the decline in domestic demand. The picture is 
somehow different in other developing countries such as South Africa and Indonesia, or in developed 
countries that have been harshly hit by the crisis such as Italy and Spain. In South Africa and Indonesia, 
the reduction in private consumption explains less than 60 percent of the overall decrease in real GDP 
in 2020. In the case of Italy and Spain, it is about 73 and 64 percent, respectively. Both Italy and Spain 
experienced sizeable contractions in the trade balance due to the tough crisis in the tourist and 
hospitality industry.   
 
Second, Latin America is the region with the highest share of contact-intensive employment (over total 
employment) in the World (IMF, 2020c). To a large extent, this is due to a “perverse” regional 
productive specialization in relatively low-skill “contact-intensive” sectors such as transport, hotels 
and restaurant, trade, and storage7. Following the UN (2021), there are quite striking productive 
asymmetries between Latin America and emerging (see China and India) or newly industrialized (see 
South Korea and Singapore) Asian countries. Whilst the former relies upon relatively “low value-
added” services that have been more heavily exposed to the pandemic, the latter have increased their 
participation to high-skill high value-added services such as ICT, finance, education, R&D and business-
related services. This structural divergence is of paramount importance given that high-skill high-value 
added services have been less affected by Covid (they can be more easily performed via 
homeworking); they are increasingly traded in international markets8; they are characterized by 
economies of scale and offer wider opportunities for innovation and learning-by-doing9. Such 
structural productive asymmetries among EDE countries may help to explain why, after the outbreak 
of Covid-19, Latin America has suffered the most acute drop in employment compared to both 
developed and other emerging economies (IMF, 2020c).  
 
Third, even neglecting for a second diverging productive structures in the service industry, Latin 
American countries have been penalized by “bad” specialization in or participation to global value 
chains of those industrial sectors that have been hit the most by the crisis. This is the case, for instance, 
of the oil and energy industry in Colombia and Ecuador. The collapse in the global price of energy 
products, which only partially rebounded in the second half of 2020, may significantly restrain capital 
accumulation in these oil-dependent economies. A similar line of reasoning may apply to Mexico and 
Brazil for the case of the automotive industry. When looking at trade statistics, trade in the automotive 
sector declined by almost 20 percent in the first half of 2020. On the contrary, trade in office machines 
and communication equipment, i.e., staple productive sectors in emerging Asian countries, expanded 
by around 10 percent (see UN, 2021). In the end, Latin American vulnerability to Covid-19 may be 
partially attributed to the traditional high dependence on natural resources, energy products in 
particular, and to a far less developed service sector. In addition, it may also come from the 
idiosyncratic exposure to the economic implications of the pandemic characterizing the few 
medium/high-tech Latin American manufacturing industries. 
 
GDP, “C” represents private consumption, “G” is final government purchases, “I” is gross capital formation and “NX” is net 
exports in goods and services. The subfix “t” refers to 2020, whilst “t – 1” to 2019.  
7  The high dependence of Latin American economies on contact -intensive non-teleworkable jobs is also due to lack of ICT 
infrastructures such as access to broadband internet.  
8  The 2021 UN World Economic Situation and Prospects (UN, 2021) notes that trade in high -skill services has increased faster 
than trade in goods over the last 15 years. Interestingly, the increasing participation of emerging economies to this type of  
services has mostly concentrated in emerging and newly industrialized Asian countries.  
9  According to Baldwin and Forslid (2020), high-skill services may somehow present similar growth-enhancing properties 
traditionally attributed to manufacturing. 
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3. Financial integration, capital inflows and productive 
development in EDE countries. 
 
The possible role of underdeveloped productive structures in exacerbating the economic implications 
of Covid-19 brings back structural change and productive development as central goals of any policy 
aiming at feeding a sustained and sustainable post-Covid recovery. The analysis of available policy 
options first requires the identification of the factors that may have been source of enduring 
productive backwardness in EDE countries. In this report, we will pay attention to the relation 
between productive development and non-FDI capital flows. 
 
The literature about the causal relation between capital flows and growth in EDE countries is quite 
abundant. It now shows quite a large consensus among economists about the fact that surges in 
capital inflows, perhaps stimulated by financial liberalization reforms, may eventually increase 
macroeconomic instability (Taylor, 1998; Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999; Ocampo et al., 2008) whilst 
paying relatively little, if anything, in terms of faster growth (Ostry et al., 2016). The detrimental 
effects of increased financial integration might not be limited to short-run fluctuations only, but may 
well extend to medium/long-run dynamics if financial and currency turbulences or full-fledged crises 
are followed by enduring “balance sheet” depressions, permanent output losses and slack economic 
recoveries (Cera and Saxena, 2008, Koo, 2014). 
 
Despite the economic literature has dedicated considerable attention to the link between financial 
liberalization, international capital movements and macroeconomic dynamics, it has largely neglected 
to investigate whether capital inflows, short-term volatile portfolio investment and international 
credit in particular, may also shape long-run development trajectories by affecting structural change 
and the evolution of the productive structure of EDE economies 10. At the best of our knowledge, a 
small bunch of contributions has tried to address, implicitly or explicitly, such a topic. 
 
Taylor (1998) analyzes the unstable macroeconomic dynamics of some emerging economies in the 
aftermath of financial liberalizations at the end of the 1980s or beginning of the 1990s. In doing so, he 
spots the significant connection between large capital (speculative) inflows, episodes of financial 
euphoria and hypertrophic real estate sectors in Mexico and Thailand. In the case of Mexico, he notes 
that easy access to international finance enabled credit to housing to increase by 1000 percent in a 
few years, whilst productive investment barely recovered above 20 percent of GDP from the slump of 
the lost decade in the 1980s. 
  
Gallagher and Prates (2014) analyze the growing importance of financial investors (via speculation in 
the derivative market) for the determination of commodity prices and exchange rate dynamics in 
Brazil in the first decade of the 2000s. In their view, the interplay between large inflows of 
(speculative) capitals and the commodity boom may have exacerbated the resource curse and the 
process of premature de-industrialization Brazil has been experiencing for a long time. Botta et al. 
 
10  Acosta et al. (2009) analyze the possible Dutch disease-like effects of international remittances, while Rajan and 
Subramanian (2011) study the role of international aid.  
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(2016) provide empirical evidence of similar finance-led structural changes in Colombia. In this case, 
initial increases in natural resource-oriented FDI attracted booming portfolio inflows that caused even 
stronger appreciations of the Colombian peso and a statistically significant squeeze in the contribution 
of manufacturing to domestic GDP. 
 
Benigno et al. (2015) and Bortz (2018) provide more general empirical evidence about the effects of 
large capital inflows on the productive structure of recipient economies. Bortz (2018) shows that there 
is a positive correlation between the increase in gross capital inflows towards some EDE countries and 
the variation in the contribution of the financial, real estate and commerce sectors to GDP. Benigno 
et al. (2015) consider a sample of 70 high-middle income countries and analyze the sectorial 
reallocation of productive inputs (i.e., sectorial employment and investment shares) during periods of 
large capital inflows, as proxied by historically large current account deficits. They find that periods of 
net capital inflows bonanza are associated to the squeeze (at least in relative terms) of manufacturing. 
To some extent, the findings from Benigno et al. (2015) complement the evidence of premature de-
industrialization in several EDE countries (with the exception of Asia) put forward by Rodrik (2016). 
Premature de-industrialization could be partially due to the long-term structural effects carried out 
by increasing capital inflows towards more financially integrated EDE economies.  
 
In the present report, we want to expand further this emerging and still underdeveloped stream of 
literature. More specifically, we take inspiration from the regression analysis carried out by Rodrik 
(2016) and try to identify the causes of premature de-industrialization that Rodrik captures but leaves 
unexplained through simple time-specific dummy variables. We will try to assess the role played by 
capital inflows, volatile portfolio investment and international credit in particular. Our analysis goes 
beyond Benigno et al. (2015) since that we take into account direct data about (some types of) net 
capital inflows rather than indirect evidence provided by current account data. Also, we expand the 
set of dependent variables measuring productive development by considering the broader Economic 
Complexity Index (ECI) on top of more conventional measures related to manufacturing. The details 
and the results of our empirical analysis are described in sub-section 3.2. Before that, sub-section 3.1 
discusses, from a theoretical point of view, the possible mechanisms through which capital inflows to 
EDE economies may influence the development of their productive structures.  
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3.1 Financial integration, capital flows and productive structures 
in EDE countries: a theoretical overview  
 
Few contributions have theoretically investigated what Benigno and Fornaro (2014) label the 
“financial” resource curse and Botta (2017, 2021) defines the financial Dutch disease. Lartey (2008) 
and Benigno and Fornaro (2014) present mainstream new-Keynesian models where large access to 
foreign capitals may give rise to consumption booms and to standard Dutch disease-like phenomena 
by increasing the (relative) price of non-tradable goods versus tradable ones11.  
 
In the mainstream real economy supply-side framework adopted by Lartey (2008), capital inflows de 
facto boil down to foreign-made investment goods used as productive inputs in the production of 
domestic manufactured products. As a consequence, Lartey (2008) completely ignores all the financial 
and monetary aspects related to international capital movements such as the determination of 
domestic and international interest rates and of the spread between them, the determination of the 
nominal (and hence real) exchange rate in the FX market, or changes in the confidence of international 
investors. In Benigno and Fornaro (2014), episodes of large capital inflows are modeled as a reduction 
in the exogenously given interest rate that encourages larger international borrowing, widening 
current account deficits and a consumption boom in the home economy. Adjustments in the economy 
mainly take place via changes in relative prices in the context of an optimizing inter-temporal traverse 
towards the long-run equilibrium. Once again, there is no attention whatsoever to crucial financial 
mechanisms such as (short-term) speculation in different sectors, financial instability, the 
determination of financial variables in domestic and international financial markets. Botta (2017) and 
Botta (2021) partially address these lacks by describing finance-led processes of de-industrialization 
(read reductions in the relative importance of manufacturing) that take place due to changes in the 
level and in the volatility of leading macro-financial prices such as the nominal exchange rate and/or 
the expected returns on speculative (read real estate) assets12. 
 
On the basis of the above-mentioned contributions, it is possible to identify four channels through 
which abundant capital inflows, portfolio investment and international (bank) credit more specifically, 
may affect structural changes in the real side of the economy. We list them in Figure 1 below. 
 
The first channel is related to the real-side effect that surges in portfolio inflows and international 
credit may bring about by affecting the nominal and real exchange rate and, therefore, the price 
competitiveness of home-made goods and services. This is the traditional “Dutch disease-like” effect. 
At least in the short-medium term, say in the expansionary phase of the financial cycle, abundant 
 
11  Lartey (2008) claims that appropriate monetary policy may actually impede such a finance -led Dutch disease to take place. 
In his view, this happens when monetary authorities adopt a “generalized” Taylor rule and fix the domestic interest rate by 
also considering price inflation of non-tradable goods and the dynamics of the discrepancy between the nominal and real 
exchange rates with respect to their steady state values.   
12  Taylor (1991, ch.6) presents a structuralist model capturing the economic consequences of financial bubbles and 
speculative waves in countries such as Kuwait in the 1980s and Chile in the 1970s in the aftermath of the military coup. In 
the initial review of the empirical phenomena that model formalizes, Taylor (1991) describes financial booms as having very 
poor connection, if any, with the development of the non-traditional non-commodity tradable sector, say manufacturing, 
but stronger linkages with the (over-) expansion of the financial industry and/or the real estate. Taylor (1991) does not put 
foreign capitals at the center of his analysis as financial booms unfold via in ternal mechanisms. Nevertheless, he explicitly 
admits that foreign capitals can play a relevant role in triggering or feeding financial booms.  
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international capitals could feed domestic credit booms and the general expansion of the economy. 
Depending on the reaction of domestic monetary authorities, prices may increase, in particular those 
of non-tradable goods and services13. The real exchange rate may appreciate and productive factors 
find more profitable to move away from “non-traditional” tradable sectors (read manufacturing) and 
to relocate towards non-tradable ones. It is important to note that such real-side mechanism could be 
complemented and reinforced by the appreciation of the nominal exchange rate that large capital 
inflows may generate in the FX market. Although financial booms may not last long and may actually 
be followed by a reversal, “perverse” structural changes may be permanent if the (relative) squeeze 
of the tradable sector is associated with a widening irreversible technological and productivity gap 
(Botta, 2021).  
 




The nominal exchange rate is not only a component of the real exchange rate and of relative prices 
between imported and home-made goods. It is also a “financial price” since that it determines the 
domestic currency equivalent of foreign currency-denominated assets and liabilities. The “financial 
side” of the nominal exchange rate plays a fundamental role in causing changes in the balance sheets 
of firms with a currency mismatch between foreign currency-denominated liabilities and domestic 
currency-denominated assets. Since 2010, this is increasingly the case of companies in emerging 
economies, and of Latin American ones in particular (Chui et al., 2016; Perez-Caldentey et al., 2019). 
In this context, the appreciation of the nominal exchange rate caused by booming capital inflows 
 
13  The asymmetric effects of (international) credit-led domestic expansions over prices in different sectors may be due to 
the fact that, in small open economies, prices of tradable goods and services are at least partially determined in the 
international goods market rather than by internal economic mechanisms.   
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makes the balance sheet of domestic firms more solid. This, in turn, may induce them to raise 
investment, not only because the price of imported capital goods declines, but because a stronger 
balance sheet may allow them to scale up purchases of new vintage capital equipments. This is the 
second channel portrayed in Figure 1. This channel is potentially beneficial for long-run productive 
development if higher investment help to fill the technology gap and to introduce process and product 
innovation that may support the strategic integration of the economy in the international goods 
market. 
 
Albeit potentially positive, channel 2 may emerge as consequence of the booming phase of a 
traditional Minskyan financial cycle in EDE countries (Frenkel and Rapetti, 2009). A perverse 
destabilizing feedback between surges in capital inflows, the accumulation of foreign debt in 
particular, and the exchange rate dynamics is worth mentioning here. During periods of financial 
“bonanza”, relatively cheap and abundant international liquidity may induce companies in EDE 
countries to issue large amounts of corporate bonds in international markets (see again Chui et al., 
(2016) and  Perez-Caldentey et al. (2019) for some recent empirical evidence). From a balance sheet 
point of view, the increase in the external liabilities of domestic companies is mirrored in the rise of 
capital inflows (i.e., larger amounts of foreign assets, debt instruments in this case, held by 
international creditors in EDE countries)14. These may cause a (temporary) appreciation of the 
exchange rate, which reduces the burden of foreign debt and may encourage domestic companies to 
get even more indebted in international financial markets. Past empirical evidence suggests that this 
positive feedback does not last long and most likely sets the stage for an abrupt reversal. When 
conditions in international financial markets become less favorable or “intolerance” against allegedly 
excessive external debt mounts (Reinhart et al., 2003), international capitals stop flowing in, the 
exchange rate depreciates and the debt burden becomes unsustainable. Financial turmoil, an 
exchange rate crisis and economic recession may eventually “knock at the door” of EDE countries all 
together. In this context, the above-mentioned increase in (productive?) investment may be short-
lived. It may actually concur in generating “speculative” or “Ponzi” positions at micro level. At macro 
level, fragile financial positions can bring about perverse externalities by paving the way to the burst 
of the bubble and cause an enduring drop in investment (when firms try to deleverage from 
accumulated debt) that more than compensates for the initial increase (see the central block of Figure 
1). Over the medium-to-long run, what initially appeared as a positive contribution to productive 
development may turn into a highly negative one if the demand for productive investment reacts 
strongly negatively to heightened macro instability. Early empirical evidence seems to suggest that 
this might be the case for the last financial cycle affecting Latin America in the 2000s and lasting up 
until about 2015 (see more on this below). 
 
Surges in foreign capital inflows have frequently fueled credit booms in developing and emerging 
economies (hence the need to analyze capital controls as policy tools complementing and overlapping 
with macro-prudential regulation). Credit booms may in turn affect the productive dynamics of the 
economy according to the different industries that benefit the most from the expansion of credit 
opportunities. Easy credit that prevalently finances investment in the non-traditional tradable good 
 
14  Portfolio capital inflows may also take the form of investment in equities. This type of capital inflows may contribute to 
bring about temporary appreciations of the domestic currency, with possible consequences for the structural (sectorial) 
evolution of the home economy, as much as foreign investment in  debt instruments do. Implications in terms of financial 
solidity and debt sustainability, however, are different, as equity purchases do not provide foreign investors with the 
“privileges” recognized to creditors.    
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sector can likely bear different long-term development implications than credit bubbles inflating the 
non-tradable sector, say real estate. We stress the importance of the sectorial pattern of (foreign 
capital-led) increases in credit to the private sector through channel 4 at the bottom part of Figure 1. 
This point may play a relevant role not only because of its direct effect on the evolution of the 
productive structure of the economy, but also because it may feed back on the financial position of 
domestic firms by increasing or not currency and/or maturity mismatches in their balance sheets. On 
the one hand, foreign capital-financed investment by companies in the tradable sector that may 
increase their external competitiveness and lead to a rise in export may be even associated to a 
reduction in the currency mismatch and a more solid financial position of domestic companies. On the 
other hand, if foreign capital mainly fuels companies in the non-tradable sector, the currency 
mismatch will increase as does the exposure to external shocks. Which sector(s) grabs most of the 
funds made available in the economy is a vital aspect of the short-medium-term stability and long-
term development implications of financial integration and foreign capital booms.  
 
 
3.2 Financial integration, capital flows and productive structures in 
EDE countries: an empirical analysis  
 
Following Rowthorn and Ramaswamy (1997) and Palma (2005), the productive structure of an 
economy usually changes alongside the broader development process. In the early take off stages of 
development, an increasing share of the labor force relocates from agriculture to industry, 
manufacturing in particular. The share of manufacturing increases both in terms of total employment 
and GDP. At more advanced stages, however, service expands both in absolute and in relative terms. 
The share of manufacturing contracts giving rise to an inverted U-shaped trajectory. This is the 
(expected) de-industrialization phase of the whole development process, which Tregenna (2009) 
identifies with the joint reduction in the contribution of manufacturing to total employment and 
(nominal) GDP15.  
 
Given such “fundamental” evolution, premature de-industrialization takes place if the contraction in 
the share of manufacturing kicks in at a lower level of per-capita GDP (or of the manufacturing share 
itself) than usual (say with respect to what historically observed in advanced economies or in the 
whole sample of countries taken into consideration). Rodrik (2016) tries to detect premature 
industrialization for a sample of developed, emerging and developing countries. He does so by 
introducing period-specific dummy variables in a regression analysis featuring per-capita GDP and the 
size of population, both in squared terms, as “fundamental” variables capturing the inverted U-shaped 
trend characterizing (the share of) manufacturing. In this report, we aim at empirically investigating 
the possible link between capital inflows and changes in the productive structure of EDE economies 
by building upon and developing Rodrik’s analysis further. Whilst Rodrik (2016) detects but does not 
explain premature industrialization, we try to verify whether periods of abundant capital inflows, say 
periods of financial bonanza, may be an additional source of de-industrialization on top of the 
structural factors mentioned above.  
 
15  Statistical evidence about de-industrialization is far less evident if one takes data about manufacturing GDP share in real 
terms. The contribution of manufacturing to real GDP is more stable through time once it reaches the peak, and the 
subsequent decline far smaller. This stylized fact may be partially due to difficulties in the computation of sectoral deflators 
as well as to different dynamics in the prices of tradable and non-tradable goods.    
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From a technical point of view, our analysis is based on a sample of 36 countries including both 
developed, emerging and developing economies. Our sample significantly overlaps with Rodrik’s one 
but for six countries (Ethiopia, Malawi, Morocco, Taiwan, West Germany and Zambia) for which 
updated data are not available either for the dependent variables or the financial explanatory ones. 
Our dataset covers the period from 1980 to 2017. Table A.1 in the Appendix presents the full list of 
countries included in our study. Table A.2, in turn, reports the sources of our data as well as descriptive  
statistics. We take most of data from either the updated Groningen Growth and Development Center 
(GGDC) dataset or international institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank (WB) and ECLAC. Data 
about the Economic Complexity Index (ECI) are taken from the Atlas of Economic Complexity16. 
 
In order to perform our analysis, we have expanded the baseline regression model (without period-
specific dummies) in Rodrik (2016) by including a set of additional explanatory variables, see Equation 
(1) below:  
 
𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑥𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑥𝑖,𝑡
2 + 𝛽3𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑖,𝑡
2 + 𝛽5𝑑𝑖,𝑡
𝐹𝐼𝑁 + 𝛽6𝑡𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑔𝑖,𝑡
𝑅𝑂𝑊 + 𝛽8𝑟𝑖,𝑡
𝑁𝑅 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡   
(1) 
 
In Equation (1), 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 stands for the various dependent variables we use to measure industrial 
development and, more broadly, the degree of technological and productive complexity 
characterizing an economy. Consistent with Rodrik (2016), we first consider the share of 
manufacturing over total employment (manemp) and over GDP, both in nominal (nommanva) and 
real terms (realmanva). We also use ECI as originally computed by Hausmann and Hidalgo (2007) as 
additional robustness check for the effects of capital inflows over productive development.  
 
On the right-hand side of equation (1), 𝑥𝑖,𝑡 stands for the level of real per-capita GDP. 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑖,𝑡 is the 
level of population. Different from Rodrik (2016), we do not take natural log transformations of these 
variables in order to maintain consistency with the other explanatory factors included in our analysis. 
In Equation (1), the list of control explanatory variables includes 𝑡𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑖,𝑡 = (𝑒𝑥𝑝 + 𝑖𝑚𝑝) 𝐺𝐷𝑃⁄ , which 
measures the degree of trade openness characterizing an economy. It is defined as the ratio of exports 
(exp) plus imports (imp) over GDP. 𝑔𝑖,𝑡
𝑅𝑂𝑊 is the rate of growth of the Rest of the World (ROW), whilst 
𝑟𝑖,𝑡
𝑁𝑅 is the share of natural resource rents over GDP as measured by Lange et al., (2018). 
 
In Equation (1), 𝑑𝑖,𝑡
𝐹𝐼𝑁 is “our” financial variable. It is meant to capture the role of (abundant) capital 
inflows over the productive structure of the recipient economies. We use two different specifications 
of this variable. We first compute 𝑑𝑖,𝑡
𝐹𝐼𝑁 as a financial dummy variable that takes value 1 during periods 
of large capital inflows and 0 otherwise (see below for the definition of periods of large capital 
inflows). Second, as a robustness check, we re-run our model using the “original” data about net non-
FDI capital inflows in place of the financial dummy variable just mentioned. By doing this, we want to 
 
16  The ECI index depends, among other factors, on the degree of sectorial diversification characterizing the economy. Indeed, 
this influences the extent by which the economy may develop comparative advantages in a wide range of industries or not. 
Following Imbs and Warzciag (2003), countries tend to follow an inverted U-shaped pattern of diversification along the 
overall development process. The ECI index may display a similar evolution and, to some extent, mimic the process of 
industrial development described by Rowthorn and Ramaswamy (1997). In our analysis, we rescale the original ECI index in 
the (0-100) range to maintain consistency with other variables included in our estimations.      
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verify that our definition (and computation) of periods of “financial bonanza” does not bias our 
findings in any way. 
 
We compute our financial variable based on net non-FDI capital inflows. In doing this, we depart from 
Benigno et al., (2015), who use just an indirect measure of net capital inflows based on deficits in the 
current account plus variations in foreign reserves. Also, we do not consider the full range of capital 
flows. More specifically, we do not include FDI and changes in the amount of foreign reserves in our 
analysis, but we focus on private sector’s portfolio investment and international credit only. On the 
one hand, the purpose of this report is to investigate the long-term effects of the supposedly most 
volatile components of capital flows, hence the focus on portfolio investment and international credit. 
On the other hand, changes in foreign reserves may be somehow the results of discretional actions 
taken by domestic monetary institutions to control the evolution of the exchange rate and as a form 
of macro-prudential policy. They cannot be directly associated to the behavior of the “private” sector 
of the economy we are primary interested in (although decision making by economic actors can 
certainly be influenced by the economic consequences of the accumulation of foreign reserves and/or 
sterilization measures).  
 
In this analysis, we consider net rather than gross capital inflows. We do this because empirical data 
tell us that, from 1980 to 2017, net capital inflows have been more volatile than gross figures 17. This 
(perhaps unexpected) result is due to procyclical movements in international financial transactions 
involving domestic capitals. In the case of EDE countries in particular, at the start of a financial boom, 
positive foreign capital inflows are magnified by the (at least partial) repatriation of domestic  capitals 
that were previously invested abroad. Symmetrically, the outbreak of financial turmoil may reduce 
gross foreign capital inflows and encourage domestic capitals to leave the country in search for safer 
foreign assets. Consistent with the theoretical analysis developed in sub-section 3.1, heightened 
financial volatility is one way through which international capital movements may affect the 
productive development of an economy. We try to capture this aspect by taking the most volatile 
measure of capital inflows 
 
Before implementing our estimations, we run a battery of tests about the presence of 
heteroskedasticity, autocorrelation and cross-sectional dependence in our data. The results of our 
tests are reported in Table A.3. Pearson test suggests that our data are not characterized by cross-
sectional dependence. Heteroskedasticity and auto-correlation, in turn, are present. For this reason, 
we implement our analysis by using an Ordinary Least Square Panel Corrected Standard Error (OLS-
PCSE) estimator in order to properly take into account these features of our dataset. 
 
3.2.1 Periods of large net capital inflows and productive development 
 
Since the beginning of the so-called “neoliberal” era in the second half of the 1970s, foreign capitals 
towards EDE economies have been mostly described as moving in waves and characterized by 
booms and bursts (Diaz-Alejandro, 1985; Calvo et al., 1996; Frenkel and Rapetti, 2009). Financial 
deregulation, capital account liberalization and increasing integration in global financial markets 
 
17 If we take standard deviation (SD) as synthetic measure of volatility in capital flows, SD characterizing net non -FDI capital 
inflows towards EDE countries is equal to 7.82 for data from 1980 to 2017. It is considerably higher than the corresponding 
statistics for gross non-FDI capital inflows, which is equal to 3.64.   
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have facilitated surges in capital inflows (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999). Both pull and push factors 
have concurred to generate periods of “financial bonanza”, with the latter being more relevant in 
the case of portfolio flows and international credit (Eichengreen at al., 2017). 
 
The 2007-2008 world financial crisis and, more relevantly, extraordinary monetary policies 
undertaken in the aftermath to stabilize the global financial system may have caused a structural 
break in the behavior of international capitals. Unprecedentedly low interest rates in the center of 
the global financial system (say North America and Europe) and the enormous amount of liquidity 
injected onto financial markets by leading central banks may have triggered off an unusually long 
period of abundant (net) capital inflows. A simple two-sample t-test on international capital data 
before and after 2008 (see Table 1 below) confirms that net non-FDI capital inflows towards EDE 
countries have increased remarkably since 2009. This result holds true even if we exclude the “lost 
decade” of the 1980s from our dataset, which traditionally featured very meagre capital inflows 
towards EDE countries in the wake of the 1982 external debt crisis. In the case of Sub-Saharan 
African countries, relatively large capital inflows seem to have targeted this region for the first time 
in history. In Latin America, the post-2008 rise in net non-FDI capital inflows is always statistically 
significant regardless we consider the 1980s or not. Moreover, net non-FDI capital inflows to Latin 
America seem to have become less volatile than before. 
 
Table 1 – Structural break in net non-FDI capital inflows before and after 2008 
 
  Mean net non-FDI capital inflows (% of GDP)  Standard deviation 
COUNTRY\PERIOD 1980-2008 2009-2017 Difference 1980-2008 2009-2017 
Full sample 4.05 6.81 2.75*** 7.36 12.29 
    (0.0001)     
EDE countries 2.13 5.98 3.85*** 5.83 12.74 
    (0.0000)     
Latin America 2.12 5.33 3.21***  4.63 3.93  
    (0.0000)     
Asia 5.05 7.66 2.61* 10.08 9.40 
    (0.0746)     
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.87 6.52 5.65*** 2.31 24.45 
    (0.0070)     
Country\Period 1990-2008 2009-2017 Difference 1990-2008 2009-2017 
Full sample 5.59 6.81 1.22 8.23 12.29 
    (0.1344)     
EDE countries 3.03 5.98 2.95*** 6.53 12.74 
    (0.0006)     
Latin America 2.96 5.33 2.37*** 4.28 3.93 
    (0.0001)     
Asia 7.22 7.66 0.44 11.85 9.40 
    (0.8017)     
Sub-Saharan Africa 1.31 6.52 5.21** 2.74 24.45 
    (0.0428)     
Note: ***(p < 0.01); **(p < 0.05); *(p < 0.1). 
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The statistical evidence reported in Table 1 might describe a sort of post-2008 boom-without-burst 
dynamics in the behavior of the most speculative component of international capitals. This fact 
notwithstanding, two caveats are to take into account about such seemingly “new normal” in 
international financial markets. First, our findings confirm that “exogenous” push factors continue to 
play a key role in the determination of portfolio investment and international credit towards EDE 
countries. The most recent data about capital movements in 2020 corroborates this perspective. 
Indeed, the dramatic rebound in international capitals to EDE countries in the second half of 2020 
after the collapse registered in the first quarter is largely due to the new huge load of liquidity created 
by most relevant central banks worldwide in response to Covid-19. Secondly, and consistent with the 
previous point, there is no guarantee this long period of large capital inflows will last forever. Indeed, 
international capitals towards EDE countries suddenly dropped and reverted their direction as soon 
as Covid-19 spread through several developed countries in March 2020, as they did in 2013 with 
“Taper Tantrum” (see IIF, 2020a). In the end, whilst volatility in international capitals may have 
temporarily gone, it certainly should not be forgotten. 
 
Given these features in the recent evolution of international capitals, we identify periods of large 
capital inflows by following a similar approach to Benigno et al., (2015). We focus on “unusually” high 
levels of net non-FDI capital inflows rather than on marked changes in their dynamics (see Reinhart 
and Reinhart (2009), for instance). More specifically, we define periods of large capital inflows as 
follows: 
 
Definition: large capital inflows are periods during which (i) net non-FDI capital inflows are not 
negative or equal to zero; (ii) they present positive values for at least three years in a row; (iii) the sub-
period average is higher than the full-period country-specific average adjusted (increased) by ten 
percent of one standard deviation. 
 
Similar to other contributions adopting an “event identification-based” approach, our definition of 
large capital inflows is somehow discretional. Yet, the three criteria just mentioned may present some 
useful properties. First, they put emphasis on periods of large capital inflows that extend beyond the 
short run and that may be long enough to induce enduring consequences on the productive structure 
of an economy. Other way around, our definition may help us to exclude from our analysis isolated 
spikes in international capital flows that may hardly bear any structural economic implication. Second, 
it tends to select periods of time characterized by some “internal” pattern or consistency with financial 
markets’ “conventions” about recipient economies, i.e., capital flows are relatively stable and do not 
abruptly switch from positive to negative values. Third, it may take in due account countries’ 
peculiarities by paying attention to country-specific averages and variability. Forth, our definition 
seems to be able to capture all the major episodes of large capital inflows already tracked by the 
economic literature for the set of countries at stake (say, financial booms in Latin America and Asia in 
the 1980s or 1990s, as well as pre-2007 large capital inflows to peripheral eurozone countries).  
 
We identify 60 episodes of large capital inflows from 1980 to 2017. They are listed in Table A.4 in the 
Appendix. We include in our list also periods of time that, strictly speaking, fall shorter than a three 
year span, but are part of well-known episodes of large capital inflows that started before 1980 and 
that would conform to our definition if considered in their entirety (see Argentina 1980-1981, for 
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Tables 2 – 5 below report the results of our regression analysis incorporating the definition of large 
capital inflows just described. Table 2 looks at manufacturing employment share. Tables 3 and 4 pay 
attention to nominal and real manufacturing GDP share, respectively. Table 5, finally, put emphasis 
on the ECI index. We estimate equation (1) for the full sample, as well as for developed and EDE 
countries taken separately. 
 
Our results well replicate Rodrik’s findings when we look at the structural factors (GDP per capita and 
population) that may account for the natural process of de-industrialization characterizing economies 
all along the whole development process. More importantly for the sake of our analysis, Tables 2 – 5 
witness the existence of a negative correlation between periods of large capital inflows (as captured 
by “our” financial dummy variable) and our measures of productive development (i.e., the relative 
importance of manufacturing and the ECI index). When net non-FDI capital inflows are particularly 
abundant, the manufacturing share tends to contract and the economic complexity index decreases. 
Other way around, large net non-FDI capital inflows may be source of premature de-industrialization 
or declining productive complexity, i.e., a lower degree of diversification of the economy and loss of 
comparative advantages in high-skill intensive productive sectors.  
 
The negative correlation between periods of large capital inflows and productive development is 
statistically significant in all our “full sample” regressions (column (1) in Tables 2 – 5) but the 
estimations related to the real manufacturing GDP share (realmanva). In this case, the coefficient 
associated to the financial dummy variable remains negative, as expected, but turns statistically 
insignificant. This result is consistent with Rodrik’s findings and the general recognition of far less solid 
evidence of de-industrialization when attention is on the real manufacturing GDP share. 
 
When we split the analysis between advanced countries and EDE economies, there is clear evidence 
that the long-term detrimental effects of large capital inflows are more serious in the latter than in 
the former. EDE countries always experience statistically significant contractions (at least at 10% 
confidence level) in the manufacturing employment share, in the manufacturing nominal GDP share 
and in the economic complexity index when net non-FDI capital inflows stand at “higher than normal” 
levels (column (2) in Tables 2, 3 and 5). Such a negative effect seems to be particularly strong in the 
case of the economic complexity index. Consistent with the economic theory outlined in Figure 1, 
large net non-FDI capital inflows may fuel and feed the expansion of non-tradable sectors rather than 
(non-traditional) tradable ones. They may also lead to protracted periods of appreciation of the 
nominal and real exchange rate. These facts may in turn harm EDE countries’ capabilities to compete 
in international goods market for manufactured products and cause a premature decline in the degree 
of complexity (and diversification) of emerging and developing economies.  
 
In the case of developed economies, instead, the coefficient associated to the financial dummy 
variable becomes statistically insignificant in the case of the manufacturing employment share (see 
column (3) in Table 2). It turns into positive, albeit statistically insignificant, in the case of 
manufacturing nominal GDP share (column (3) in Table 3). The financial dummy variable continues to 
display a statistically significant (at 10% confidence level) negative correlation with the economic 
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complexity index even in advanced economies (column (3) in Table 5). Nonetheless, such an effect is 
roughly half that observed in EDE economies. 
 
Among the other explanatory factors included in our analysis, the coefficient associated to the natural 
resource variable is always negative, as expected. However, it is statistically insignificant in most of 
the estimations. Remarkable exceptions are the negative correlation with the manufacturing 
employment share when we consider the full set of countries and, more importantly, the ECI index. 
In this last case, such a negative correlation becomes statistically significant (and larger in size than in 
the full sample regression) in the specific case of EDE economies. 




Table 2 – Econometric estimations for manufacturing employment share (manemp), 1980 – 2017 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES All Countries EDE Economies Developed Economies 
    
GDP per capita 0.000616*** 0.000876*** -0.000641*** 
 (5.29e-05) (6.51e-05) (8.92e-05) 
GDP per capita, squared -1.00e-08*** -2.01e-08*** 4.40e-09*** 
 (1.09e-09) (1.81e-09) (1.17e-09) 
Population -4.82e-06* 3.37e-07 2.43e-05*** 
 (2.46e-06) (2.65e-06) (8.24e-06) 
Population, squared 0*** 0 -9.43e-11*** 
 (0) (0) (0) 
Financial boom dummy -0.253** -0.235* -0.0667 
 (0.114) (0.122) (0.184) 
Trade Openness 0.00657* 0.00381 0.0166*** 
 (0.00366) (0.00490) (0.00305) 
ROW GDP growth rate 0.00126 0.00121 0.00226 
 (0.0102) (0.00873) (0.00917) 
Total natural resources rents (% of GDP) -0.0183 -0.00124 -0.000676 
 (0.0186) (0.0197) (0.189) 
Constant 8.218*** 6.430*** 31.92*** 
 (0.566) (0.475) (1.706) 
    
Observations 896 647 249 
R-squared 0.789 0.763 0.941 
Number of c_id 36 26 10 
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Table 3 – Econometric estimations for manufacturing nominal value added share (nommanva), 1980 – 2017 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES All Countries EDE Economies Developed Economies 
    
GDP per capita 0.000215*** 0.000584*** -0.000587*** 
 (5.85e-05) (0.000124) (0.000134) 
GDP per capita, squared -4.87e-09*** -1.82e-08*** 4.70e-09*** 
 (1.07e-09) (3.85e-09) (1.74e-09) 
Population 4.92e-06 1.25e-05** 2.11e-05* 
 (4.80e-06) (5.11e-06) (1.12e-05) 
Population, squared 0 -0 -1.30e-10*** 
 (0) (0) (0) 
Financial boom dummy -0.392*** -0.576*** 0.227 
 (0.142) (0.167) (0.258) 
Trade Openness 0.00923** 0.00980 0.0104** 
 (0.00465) (0.00724) (0.00421) 
ROW GDP growth rate 0.0195* 0.0186 0.0280** 
 (0.0106) (0.0126) (0.0138) 
Total natural resources rents (% of GDP) -0.0554* -0.0492 -0.0648 
 (0.0292) (0.0316) (0.226) 
Constant 18.19*** 15.75*** 34.28*** 
 (0.900) (0.969) (2.552) 
    
Observations 888 639 249 
R-squared 0.748 0.737 0.920 
Number of c_id 36 26 10 
 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) 
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Table 4 – Econometric estimations for manufacturing real value added share (realmanva), 1980 – 2017 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES All Countries EDE Economies Developed Economies 
    
GDP per capita 0.000192*** 0.000764*** -0.000334*** 
 (5.43e-05) (0.000108) (0.000107) 
GDP per capita, squared -2.84e-09*** -1.92e-08*** 3.65e-09*** 
 (1.09e-09) (3.59e-09) (1.39e-09) 
Population -1.40e-06 5.58e-06 3.22e-05*** 
 (4.73e-06) (4.49e-06) (1.09e-05) 
Population, squared 0* 0 -1.73e-10*** 
 (0) (0) (0) 
Financial boom dummy -0.0644 -0.142 -0.0480 
 (0.101) (0.134) (0.255) 
Trade Openness 0.00382 -0.00129 0.0115*** 
 (0.00467) (0.00594) (0.00321) 
ROW GDP growth rate 0.0140** 0.0144 0.0267** 
 (0.00715) (0.00879) (0.0127) 
Total natural resources rents (% of GDP) -0.00427 -0.00721 -0.272 
 (0.0156) (0.0202) (0.190) 
Constant 15.90*** 13.09*** 24.55*** 
 (0.733) (0.801) (2.029) 
    
Observations 894 648 246 
R-squared 0.756 0.764 0.898 
Number of c id 36 26 10 
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Table 5 – Econometric estimations for Economic Complexity Index (ECI), 1980-2017 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES All Countries EDE Economies Developed Economies 
    
GDP per capita 0.00221*** 0.00219*** 0.000583** 
 (8.63e-05) (0.000199) (0.000268) 
GDP per capita, squared -2.28e-08*** -3.62e-08*** -4.17e-09 
 (1.60e-09) (6.04e-09) (3.30e-09) 
Population 1.85e-05*** 3.10e-05*** 0.000110*** 
 (6.47e-06) (6.24e-06) (3.03e-05) 
Population, squared -0 -0*** -3.80e-10*** 
 (0) (0) (9.53e-11) 
Financial boom dummy -1.135*** -1.032*** -0.489* 
 (0.305) (0.354) (0.281) 
Trade Openness -0.0159** 0.0404*** -0.0225** 
 (0.00663) (0.0135) (0.00897) 
ROW GDP growth rate 0.00150 0.000841 -0.00600 
 (0.0263) (0.0282) (0.0199) 
Total natural resources rents (% of GDP) -0.256*** -0.307*** -0.138 
 (0.0894) (0.0882) (0.297) 
Constant 33.89*** 30.24*** 66.68*** 
 (1.232) (1.465) (5.234) 
    
Observations 896 648 248 
R-squared 0.904 0.846 0.972 
Number of c_id 36 26 10 
 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) 




In order to verify the robustness of our findings, we re-run the regression model specified in Equation 
(1) by using straight data about net non-FDI capital inflows (as a percentage of GDP) rather than the 
financial dummy variable. Our goal is to ascertain that the construction of the financial dummy 
variable does not generate any bias in the results reported in Tables 2 – 5. Tables 6 – 9 below present 
the outcomes of the robustness check. They provide further support to our analysis and confirm the 
hypothesis that large capital inflows may bear negative structural consequences in terms of 
productive development and economic complexity.  
 
In Tables 6 – 9, the correlation coefficients of the net non-FDI capital inflows are always negative. If 
we restrict our focus to the regressions for the full sample of countries and for EDE economies, such 
negative correlation is statistically significant in all cases but the manufacturing employment share. 
Differently from the previous findings, it turns weakly significant (at 10% percent confidence level) 
even in the case of the real manufacturing GDP share. In developed economies, in turn, the coefficient 
for net non-FDI capital inflows is always insignificant (albeit negative). Importantly, this now applies 
also to estimations using the ECI index as dependent variable. This is an important difference with 
respects to estimations including the financial dummy variable as explanatory factor.  
 
Tables 6 – 9 also confirm our findings related to the role of natural resources. The higher the rents 
“extracted” from the exploitation of natural resources, the lower is the contribution of manufacturing 
to either GDP or total employment, as well as the economic complexity index. This negative relation 
is statistically significant for nominal manufacturing GDP share and for complexity index in the “full 
sample” regression and in the case of EDE economies. We have run an additional battery of 
regressions for emerging and developing economies considering alternative measures of the “natural 
resource curse” variable. More specifically, we have considered the share of natural resource sectors 
over GDP and the weighted price index of exported commodities 18. In both cases, results (not 
presented here for the sake of space but available on request) are in line with and reinforce those 
already discussed. Larger dependence on natural resources, whatever measure we take, always give 
rise to sizable and statistically significant negative effects over our indicators of productive 
development. The unique exception is represented by the coefficient associated to the exported 
commodity price index in the regressions for the real manufacturing GDP share. In this case, the 
estimated coefficient is statistically insignificant and gets very small counter-intuitive positive values.  
 
3.2.2  Latin America in a comparative perspective 
 
Lack of a sufficient number of observations restrains the possibility to carry out the econometric 
analysis just described at a more disaggregated regional level. Nonetheless, some simpler summary 
statistics may be useful to provide an overview, even though at more descriptive level, of the 
dichotomic evolution of the productive patterns in Latin America with respect to other EDE 
economies, Asian ones first and foremost. 
 
 
18 Weights are given by the share of each single commodity over total commodity exports.  
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Figures 2 – 4 below, for instance, describe the comparative evolution of the “manufacturing gap” in 
Latin America and in Asian economies included in our sample (excluding Japan). We compute the 
manufacturing gap as the difference between the actual contribution of manufacturing to either GDP 
or employment with respect to what would have been expected according to the  “fundamentals” 
source of industrialization/de-industrialization identified in Rodrik (2016). This difference is then 
presented as a ratio of the “expected” (Rodrik-type) level of manufacturing development. Positive 
values stand for levels of manufacturing development that are higher than “normal”. Negative values 
indicate that a process of premature de-industrialization is taking place.  
 
Regional differences emerging from Figures 2 – 4 are quite striking. On the one hand, Asian countries 
always score very large positive values for the three measures of manufacturing gap (either related to 
the manufacturing employment share or to the contribution to nominal or real GDP) we consider. On 
the other hand, in Latin America, the manufacturing gap is negative most of the time. The only partial 
exception is real manufacturing GDP share, which scores very small positive values (but still 
considerably lower than what recorded in Asia) in the 1980s and at the beginning of the 2000s.  
 
Regional differences in the levels of manufacturing development tend to widen over time due to 
different trajectories. Despite some fluctuations, the relevance of manufacturing seems to remain 
broadly constant or to increase in the case of Asian economies. In Latin America, in turn, the economy-
wide contribution of manufacturing seems to follow a downward-sloping trend, at least since the 
beginning of the 1990s. Even in the more nuanced case of real manufacturing GDP share, de-
industrialization processes (i.e., a negative and widening manufacturing gap) seem to take momentum 
during periods of large capital inflows, i.e., during the 1990s and since 2007 onwards. These findings 
are consistent with Rodrik (2016), who stresses how premature de-industrialization is a well-
established feature of productive developments in Latin America, whilst Asia has been following a 
completely different development path featuring a “larger than normal” importance  of 
manufacturing. 
 
We dig further into the possible relation between premature de-industrialization and periods of large 
capital inflows by looking at some specific country experiences. We consider the six major Latin 
American economies already mentioned in the introduction of this work and we compare them to 
“first tier” and “second tier” East Asian countries. The comparison is carried out with respect to the 
manufacturing gap in the employment share, for which data are available since 196019. Figure 5 
portrays changes in the manufacturing employment share gap in the three largest Latin American 
economies, i.e., Argentina, Brazil and Mexico. Figure 6 shows data for Chile, Colombia and Peru. In 
 
19 Tregenna (2009) rightly observes that a proper analysis of de -industrialization should consider the evolution of sectorial 
employment shares together with empirical evidence about output. Indeed, a reduction in the manufacturing employment 
share should be interpreted differently if it comes together with positive growth in manufacturing output (and even  the 
more so if the manufacturing GDP share increases) with respect to a scenario where both employment and output decline. 
In the first case, diverging dynamics between employment and output could be explained by technological progress and 
rising manufacturing productivity, so that it might actually be inappropriate to talk about de -industrialization. For the sake 
of space, in this part of the report we focus on employment data only. Nonetheless, our approach is consistent with Tregenna 
(2009). First of all, we focus on the manufacturing employment gap. Other way around, we analyze evolutions in the 
manufacturing employment share that differ from what would be expected given “natural” structural changes in the 
economy taking place all along the whole development process. Second, this part of the study should be considered as 
integrated with previous analysis about manufacturing contribution to GDP. Structural differences between Latin America 
and Asia stand out very clearly. 
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Figure 7, we focus upon the “first tier” East Asian newly industrialized countries, i.e., South Korea, 
Singapore and Taiwan. Figure 8, finally, shows the case of “second tier” East Asian countries: 
Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand. In all figures, we highlight periods of large capital inflows (grey 
areas) as detected in our econometric study. Three points are worth stressing.  
 
First, the quite long time span covered by Figures 5 – 8 enables us to identify two well distinguished 
development patterns between Latin America and East Asia. With the exception of Mexico, most of 
the time Latin American countries presented manufacturing gaps that were  negative (Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Peru and, since mid 1990s, Argentina), positive but declining (Argentina before mid 1990s), 
or a mix of both (Argentina and Chile in the last two decades).
29                                                                                  DA-COVID 19 Project paper 13/21 
 
 
Table 6 – Robustness check for manufacturing employment share (manemp) using net non-FDI capital inflows, 1980 – 2017 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES All Countries EDE Economies Developed Economies 
    
GDP per capita 0.000604*** 0.000804*** -0.000614*** 
 (5.28e-05) (7.10e-05) (7.86e-05) 
GDP per capita, squared -9.76e-09*** -1.80e-08*** 4.07e-09*** 
 (1.09e-09) (1.88e-09) (1.02e-09) 
Population -5.62e-06** -9.46e-07 2.46e-05*** 
 (2.71e-06) (3.63e-06) (7.23e-06) 
Population, squared 0*** 0 -9.29e-11*** 
 (0) (0) (0) 
Net non-FDI capital inflows (% of GDP) -0.0150 -0.00468 -0.0199 
 (0.00992) (0.00656) (0.0125) 
Trade Openness 0.00658* 0.00176 0.0174*** 
 (0.00371) (0.00488) (0.00252) 
ROW GDP growth rate 0.000288 0.000418 0.00141 
 (0.00934) (0.00662) (0.0107) 
Total natural resources rents (% of GDP) -0.0166 -0.00187 -0.115 
 (0.0176) (0.0163) (0.214) 
Constant 8.300*** 6.939*** 31.50*** 
 (0.583) (0.535) (1.480) 
    
Observations 896 647 249 
R-squared 0.786 0.728 0.936 
Number of c_id 36 26 10 
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Table 7 – Robustness check for manufacturing nominal value added share (nommanva) using net non-FDI capital inflows, 1980 – 2017 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES All Countries EDE Economies Developed Economies 
    
GDP per capita 0.000242*** 0.000451*** -0.000548*** 
 (5.55e-05) (0.000125) (0.000131) 
GDP per capita, squared -5.13e-09*** -1.57e-08*** 4.39e-09*** 
 (1.02e-09) (3.64e-09) (1.70e-09) 
Population 3.06e-06 1.41e-05** 2.12e-05* 
 (4.61e-06) (5.89e-06) (1.11e-05) 
Population, squared 0 -0 -1.32e-10*** 
 (0) (0) (0) 
Net non-FDI capital inflows (% of GDP) -0.0386*** -0.0337*** -0.0207 
 (0.0128) (0.0126) (0.0152) 
Trade Openness 0.00836* 0.0183** 0.0108*** 
 (0.00450) (0.00772) (0.00411) 
ROW GDP growth rate 0.0193* 0.0161 0.0267* 
 (0.0114) (0.0108) (0.0142) 
Total natural resources rents (% of GDP) -0.0552* -0.0557* -0.124 
 (0.0304) (0.0297) (0.228) 
Constant 18.06*** 15.81*** 33.66*** 
 (0.888) (1.043) (2.492) 
    
Observations 888 639 249 
R-squared 0.761 0.703 0.920 
Number of c_id 36 26 10 
 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) 
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Table 8 – Robustness check for manufacturing real value added share (realmanva) using net non-FDI capital inflows, 1980 – 2017 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES All Countries EDE Economies Developed Economies 
    
GDP per capita 0.000234*** 0.000758*** -0.000328*** 
 (4.83e-05) (0.000102) (0.000113) 
GDP per capita, squared -3.67e-09*** -1.88e-08*** 3.63e-09*** 
 (9.85e-10) (3.40e-09) (1.46e-09) 
Population -2.87e-06 5.40e-06 3.17e-05*** 
 (3.94e-06) (4.72e-06) (1.12e-05) 
Population, squared 0** 0 -1.73e-10*** 
 (0) (0) (0) 
Net non-FDI capital inflows (% of GDP) -0.0246** -0.0246* -0.00765 
 (0.120) (0.0133) (0.0137) 
Trade Openness 0.00296 -5.87e-05 0.0117*** 
 (0.00431) (0.00592) (0.00343) 
ROW GDP growth rate 0.0152* 0.0141* 0.0239* 
 (0.00816) (0.00856) (0.0122) 
Total natural resources rents (% of GDP) -0.0108 -0.00726 -0.201 
 (0.0181) (0.0195) (0.176) 
Constant 15.87*** 13.05*** 24.43*** 
 (0.689) (0.795) (2.133) 
    
Observations 894 648 245 
R-squared 0.775 0.764 0.903 
Number of c_id 36 26 10 
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Table 9 – Robustness check for Economic Complexity Index (ECI) using net non-FDI capital inflows, 1980-2017 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES All Countries EDE Economies Developed Economies 
    
GDP per capita 0.000121*** 0.000117*** 3.36e-05** 
 (4.51e-06) (9.81e-06) (1.24e-05) 
GDP per capita, squared -1.24e-09*** -1.87e-09*** -2.04e-10 
 (8.23e-11) (2.86e-10) (1.53e-10) 
Population 8.80e-07** 1.55e-06*** 5.77e-06*** 
 (4.05e-07) (4.28e-07) (1.31e-06) 
Population, squared -0 -0* -0*** 
 (0) (0) (0) 
Net non-FDI capital inflows (% of GDP) -0.00489*** -0.00526*** -0.00163 
 (0.00146) (0.00165) (0.00127) 
Trade Openness -0.000728* 0.00237*** -0.00146*** 
 (0.000375) (0.000718) (0.000396) 
ROW GDP growth rate -3.36e-05 -6.82e-05 -0.000667 
 (0.00144) (0.00153) (0.00124) 
Total natural resources rents (% of GDP) -0.0137*** -0.0154*** -0.00957 
 (0.00488) (0.00468) (0.0176) 
Constant -0.979*** -1.168*** 0.777*** 
 (0.0691) (0.0776) (0.250) 
    
Observations 895 648 247 
R-squared 0.651 0.432 0.872 
Number of c_id 36 26 10 
 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) 
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Figure 2 – Manufacturing employment share gap in Latin America and Asia, 1980 – 2017 
 
 






Figure 3 – Nominal GDP manufacturing share gap in Latin America and Asia, 1980 – 2017 
 
 
Source: Authors’ computations on the basis of data from GGDC. 







Figure 4 – Real GDP manufacturing share gap in Latin America and Asia, 1980 – 2017 
 
 
Source: Authors’ computations on the basis of data from GGDC. 
 
 
“Active” industrial policies in the 1960s and in the 1970s may have temporarily contributed to 
compensate for the sub-dimensioned size of domestic manufacturing by encouraging domestic 
substitution for imported goods (see, for instance, Chile before 1973 and Brazil between 1974 and 
1978). The switch to neoliberal policies since 1980s, instead, may have prompted a further “relative” 
downsizing of domestic manufacturing. Mexico is the noteworthy exception to this, as its productive 
structure went through a considerable shift towards (maquila-based) manufacturing after Mexican 
integration in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Given these general trends, periods 
of large capital inflows may have accelerated or exacerbated the process of premature de-
industrialization in Latin America (see more on this below). The picture related to East Asian countries 
is somehow opposite. All East Asian countries started with more or less acute negative manufacturing 
(employment) gaps, which however followed a long-term positive trend over time and became, in 
most of the cases, largely positive. Malaysia and Thailand now present manufacturing sectors, whose 
size is comparable to the Mexican one. In “first tier” East Asian countries, their positive manufacturing 
employment share gap ranges from being about two times (see South Korea) to more than six time 
larger than that of Mexico. In East Asian countries, periods of large capital inflows did not seem to 
revert such long-run trends, which are likely rooted in the different type of industrial and 
macroeconomic policies followed in East Asia with respect to Latin America (Ocampo and Porcile, 
2020) – see more than this below. 
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Second, the actual share of manufacturing employment and, as a consequence, the manufacturing 
employment gap seem to move pro-cyclically. In general, the manufacturing employment gap 
worsens during major domestic and/or “imported” international economic crises. It may improve, 
instead, during periods of strong domestic or worldwide economic growth, also depending on the 
capability of the economy of benefitting from upward phases in global business cycles. This seems to 
be a common pattern among Latin American and East Asian countries. See, for instance, the 
dramatically negative values taken by the manufacturing employment gap in Argentina at the heights 
of the Argentinian crisis at the beginning of the 2000s (see Figure 5), the case of Mexico in 1995 after 
the outbreak of the “Tequila” crisis (see Figure 5), or the downswing observed in East Asian economies 
in correspondence of the 1997 East Asian crisis (see Figures 7 and 8). Alternatively, see “relative” 
throats in the evolution of the manufacturing gap recorded in most if not all the economies, Latin 
America and East Asia alike, at about the time of the 2007-2008 financial crisis. Latin American 
economies, however, also present some noteworthy exceptions to such a stylized fact. Take the case 
of Mexico at the beginning of the 1990s before the “Tequila” crisis. In that period, up until the end of 
1994, large net non-FDI capital inflows contributed to boost Mexican growth, at least with respect to 
economic stagnation during the “lost decade” of the 1980s (Krugman, 1999). Yet, manufacturing 
employment share contracted quite substantially, and the manufacturing gap decreased by almost 15 
percentage points even in a fast-growing economy. We can observe very similar structural dynamics 
in expanding economies in about the same period in Brazil and Argentina, as well as in Chile and 
Colombia. Even before that, Chile experienced a sizable contraction of the manufacturing employment 
share and worsening manufacturing gaps during the short-lived foreign capital-led economic boom it 
went through at the end of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s. Indeed, Chile is usually 
considered a frontrunner of financial integration among EDE economies. In that period, very large 
capital inflows (international credit in particular) fueled Chilean economic rebound after painful 
neoliberal reforms were introduced by the military junta in 1974 and 1975. It is however quite clear 
that large capital inflows did not target the development of domestic manufacturing but pushed for 
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Figure 5 – Manufacturing employment gap and large net non-FDI capital inflows in large Latin 
American countries: Argentina, Brazil and Mexico, 1960 – 2018 
 
 





Figure 6 – Manufacturing employment gap and large net non-FDI capital inflows in small Latin 
American countries: Chile, Colombia and Peru, 1960 – 2018 
 
 
Source: Authors’ computations on the basis of data from GGDC and ECLAC. 





Third, the effects of periods of large capital inflows on the structural features of East Asian countries 
in the 1990s seem to be quite different than that experienced by Latin American economies. In the 
case of South Korea and Singapore, abundant capital inflows did not bring about the relative 
expansion of manufacturing (employment), but they did not prompt or contribute to its squeeze 
either, as we instead observed in Latin American economies (see Figure 7). In “second tier” East Asian 
countries, surges in capital inflows were associated to quite steep initial increases in the importance 
of manufacturing that flattered out or partially reverted thereafter (see Figure 8).  
 
These different regional patterns may be partially explained by the asymmetric way through which 
surges in capital inflows influenced consumption and investment in Latin America and Asia, 
respectively. Whilst abundant capital inflows gave rise to a temporary consumption-led economic 
boom in the former region, investment was the demand component that benefitted the most from 
larger external finance in Asia (Calvo et al., 1996). Following Cimoli et al., (2020), the two regions also 
differed as to the role played by “active” industrial and “developmental” macroeconomic policies in 
the context of a general process of financial liberalization. After 1982 (and even before in the case of 
Chile and Argentina), most Latin American countries adopted a “shock therapy” approach according 
to which financial liberalization was implemented together with the dismantling of active industrial 
policy. In East Asian countries, instead, increasing liberalization of trade and financial flows 
notwithstanding, national governments kept “new developmentalist” industrial and macroeconomic 
policies well in place (Bresser-Pereira, 2012). They actively kept on pursuing the development of high-
tech tradable sectors and tried to tame finance-led appreciations in the real exchange rate that could 
harm productive development. Indeed, “the effects of financial shocks crucially depend on the 
country’s combination of macroeconomic and industrial policies” (Cimoli et al., 2020, p.1). The above-
mentioned differences in the type of institutions and policies accompanying (and perhaps contrasting) 
the effects of financial liberalization may help to explain why large capital inflows may have affected 
manufacturing development differently in Latin America and East Asia in the 1990s. By the same 
token, the (partial) rediscovery of (some) industrial policy tools in Latin America (see Cimoli et al., 
2020), together with increased awareness about long-run effects of exchange rate appreciation, may 
have led Latin American governments to more actively contrast the perverse structural implications 
of large financial inflows in the 2000s. 
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Figure 7 – Manufacturing employment gap and large net non-FDI capital inflows in “first tier” East 
Asian countries: South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan, 1960 – 2018 
 
 





Figure 8 – Manufacturing employment gap and large net non-FDI capital inflows in “second tier” East 
Asian countries: Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia, 1960 – 2018 
 
 
Source: Authors’ computations on the basis of data from GGDC and ECLAC. 
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The search for sustained and sustainable recovery out of the economic pains inflicted by Covid 
requires national governments and international organizations to tackle the causes of structural 
productive weaknesses. On top of this, recovery plans should take into account the additional 
difficulties that the pandemic itself created, read increased public and private debt and, therefore, 
expected weak private investment and stagnant consumption in the near future. There is now quite 
solid consensus among economists that fiscal stances should remain quite expansionary in order to 
avoid protracted stagnation. At least, this seems to be the stand taken by most developed countries, 
as witnessed by the ambitious public investment plan announced by the Biden administration in the 
USA and the Next Generation EU recovery plan in Europe. It makes sense to wonder whether EDE 
economies may have similar fiscal leeway. In section 4 of this report we try to assess the space for 
(public investment-based) fiscal expansions in EDE countries, Latin American ones in particular. We 
do so in three steps. First, we will briefly consider the fiscal burden that the pandemic left on the 
shoulders of national governments by forcing them to keep economic systems alive during periods of 
forced “hibernation”. Second, we will return to the role of international capitals by considering how 
financial integration and unfettered capital mobility might restrain fiscal responses in EDE countries. 
Finally, we will discuss the role of macro prudential policy in opening more space for fiscal expansions 
and tackling structural productive weaknesses by taming large capital inflows and reversals.  
  
 
4. Policies for transformative post-Covid recovery: A 
complex mix between fiscal expansions, public 
investment and macro-prudential policy 
 
4.1 Fiscal response to Covid and the way forward 
 
The spread of Covid-19 and the ensuing confinement measures aimed at containing the pandemic 
have de-facto “frozen” the functioning of the world economy. In response, most national governments 
have implemented bold fiscal actions providing income support to people unable to work, stopping 
lay-offs and avoiding firms’ bankruptcies. The costs in terms of fiscal deficits have been huge. In order 
to measure them, we take IMF’s estimates of primary public budget deficits (pfdi,t) as rough measure 
of fiscal expansion. We then adjust them for an index capturing the degree of Covid-related economic 
contractions in different countries. The purpose is to rescale fiscal stimuli so as to reflect the 
discretional nature of such policies. Whilst it is somehow normal that fiscal balances deteriorate 
during deep economic recessions, fiscal expansions in the case of economic slowdowns but still 
positive growth rates may represent “truly” discretionary measures. The adjustment index is 
constructed on the basis of the normalized deviation of country’s “i” growth rate (𝑔𝑖,𝑡) from the mean  
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sample growth rate (𝑔𝑡̅̅̅) – see Equation (1) below. 𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥,𝑡  and 𝑔𝑚𝑖𝑛,𝑡  are the highest growth rate and 
the deepest recession registered in 2020 in our sample of countries, respectively. In Equation (1), 
“adFR” is the adjusted fiscal response to Covid20:  
 
𝑎𝑑𝐹𝑅 = 𝑝𝑓𝑑𝑖,𝑡 ∗ [1 +
(𝑔𝑖,𝑡−𝑔𝑡̅̅ ̅)
(𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥,𝑡−𝑔𝑚𝑖𝑛,𝑡)
]    (1)        
 
Figure 9 below provides an overview of cross-country heterogeneity in the fiscal response to Covid.  
 
Figure 9 – “adjusted” Fiscal response to Covid-19 economic crisis, selected developed, emerging and 
developing countries, 2020 
 
Source: estimations of primary public deficit and annual growth rates taken from IMF’s World Economic Outlook 
database, October 2020.  
 
20 In computing adFR, we do not consider public guarantees backing, say, private loans. We do so because these are 
hypothetical expenditures that might take place in the event of borrowers’ defaults, but do not represent actual fiscal 
outlays. In the case of Italy, public guarantees to private loans could escalate the costs of emergency fiscal packages up to  
35 percent of GDP (from current estimates of about 9.44 percent). Given the aleatory nature of such disbursements, we 
prefer to exclude them for the computation of current fiscal expenditures. 




































Fiscal response to Covid-19 crisis
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Once we take in due consideration the depth of the crisis, advanced economies have generally 
unleashed more substantial expansionary emergency fiscal packages than EDE countries. This is 
particularly true for so-called advanced “monetarily sovereign” countries (the USA, the UK and Japan, 
for instance), where fiscal expansions by home governments can more easily benefits of discretional 
accommodating support from home central banks. The economies of the eurozone represent a partial 
exception. To some extent, this might be due to the peculiar institutional setting characterizing the 
eurozone, where the ECB is tightly detached from national governments. This, in turn, might create 
some sorts of “institutionalized” brakes to Member States’ fiscal expansions, even in the absence of a 
centralized EU federal budget and during a deep crisis21. Note, however, that figures for eurozone 
countries are influenced by the fact that we excluded aleatory disbursements related to public 
guarantees of private loans from the computation of “adjusted” fiscal responses to Covid. As reminded 
in footnote 19, data reported in Figure 9 would change quite substantially if we had included such 
hypothetical expenditures in our calculi. 
 
Fiscal responses by EDE countries have been milder, on average, with respect to advanced economies. 
There are, however, considerable differences between the very substantial fiscal expansion 
implemented in China (and, to a lesser extent, Brazil) and Mexican fiscal inertia. In any case, Figure 9 
may offer a prima-facie evidence of the more limited fiscal space available to EDE countries in the 
frontline response to Covid (see also IMF, 2021). More than this, given relatively large fiscal deficits in 
2020 and the ensuing increase in the stock of public debt, it makes sense to wonder whether global 
financial markets will allow EDE countries to maintain expansionary fiscal stances  over the upcoming 
years22. This question appears even more reasonable since that national governments are expected 
to play quite relevant roles in counteracting the enduring consequences of the pandemic. Indeed, 
worldwide 2020 economic disruption will leave households with lower income than before, and firms 
burdened with higher debts. Income and wealth inequality will worsen (Furceri et al., 2020). In such a 
context, the private sector is unlikely to take the lead of the recovery, with private investment 
remaining substantially low for quite a long time. Governments, supported by monetary authorities, 
will have to take responsibility to feed the recovery, in particular with ambitious public investment 
programs in strategic areas such as green technologies, the digital agenda, the healthcare and 
education system – see UNCTAD (2020). This is even the more so in the case of Latin American 
economies, since they present considerable gaps in terms of both physical and social infrastructures, 
also with respect to other EDE countries. On the one hand, such backwardness impeded Latin 
American economies to diversify their productive structures and compete internationally in expanding 
sectors such as high value-added high-skill tradable services. On the other hand, investment in those 
areas will be strategic source of innovation and employment in the near future. According to 
Serebrisky et al., (2020), public investment in green and digital infrastructures in Latin America could 
have an income multiplier as high as 1.5 over a five-year time span. 
 
 
21 Despite the conservative approach to fiscal policy embedded in European institutions, it is worth reminding that the EU 
has decided to suspend the application of the Stability and Growth Pact until 2023. Also, the ECB has considerably eased  
national governments’ access to financial markets by launching the Pandemic Emergency Purchasing Program (PEP) of 
national public bonds.  
22 The reference to international financial markets is motivated by the fact that, in the own words of ECLAC (2021a) “ countries 
that issue widely accepted reserve currencies have much greater scope to increase spending than countries in the region, 
which in many cases must borrow in foreign currency” (ECLAC, 2021a, p.22).  
42                                                                                  DA-COVID 19 Project paper 13/21 
 
4.2 Financial integration, international capital and fiscal space in 
emerging and developing countries 
  
According to the well-known literature about financial repression (McKinnon, 1973; Shaw, 1973), 
financial deregulation, capital account openness and financial integration were supposed to boost 
investment and growth by allowing for the emergence of a more developed and efficient financial 
system, on top of sounder fiscal and monetary policies. Such financial reforms were meant to impose 
a sort of market-driven discipline over fiscal dominance, removing inefficiencies in credit allocation, 
the crowding out of private investment by public expenditures, and the implementation of inflation-
biased macro policies (Jafarov et al., 2020). “Bond vigilantes”, together with the need of maintaining 
(foreign and domestic) investors’ confidence, would have impeded fiscal profligacy, unsustainable 
fiscal stances and, eventually, “twin-deficits” crises to occur. 
 
The fact that financial openness may discourage developing and emerging economies from embarking 
into substantial fiscal expansions obviously becomes a core topic in a period during which strong fiscal 
stimuli might be badly needed. The in-depth analysis of the relation between financial integration and 
fiscal policy stance goes well beyond the main goals of this study. Yet, the simple correlation analysis 
included in Figure 10 below offers preliminary evidence about the potential bias in favor of more 
conservative fiscal stances (i.e., small deficits or large public budget surpluses) possibly created by 
financial openness. The scatter plot portrayed in Figure 10 shows the correlation between financial 
openness as captured by (average) Chinn-Ito Index, and (average) primary public budget surplus (as a 
share of GDP). We consider an extended sample of countries for which enough fiscal data are available 
including a wide set of Latin American countries together with fast-growing South-Eastern Asian 
economies and “other” relevant EDE economies from Middle East and Africa. The full list of countries, 
together with the time coverage of our data, is reported in Table A.5 in the Appendix. 
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Source: Authors’ computation on the basis of data from IMF World Economic Outlook Database and Chinn-Ito 
database.  
 
Figure 10 reveals that, ceteris paribus, there seems to exist a positive and quite strong correlation 
between the average Chinn-Ito index and primary fiscal surpluses in EDE economies. The more 
countries are financially open and integrated in the world economy, the more likely they will be 
inclined to run relatively restrictive fiscal policy giving rise to primary budget surpluses. Latin American 
and South-Eastern Asian countries seem to locate at the opposite side of the spectrum. Latin American 
countries record, on average, the highest degree of financial openness and tend to pursue rather 
restrictive fiscal policies. South-East Asian countries, on the contrary, are, in general, less integrated 
on international financial markets and seem to have adopted more expansionary fiscal policies.  
 
The statistical evidence emerging from Figure 10 may be affected by the inclusion of some outliers in 
our sample of countries. In order to verify the robustness of our findings, we have performed some 
simple robustness checks. First, we have taken into account shorter time periods for the computation 
of average Chinn-Ito and primary fiscal balances. Second, we have removed potential outliers (i.e., 
countries in which average primary fiscal deficits deviate more than one standard deviation from 
sample average) from our sample potential outliers. Third, we have considered an alternative de-facto 
measure of financial openness à la Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2003)23 with respect to the de-jure 
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measure provided by the Chinn-Ito index. All the three checks confirm the positive relation between 
financial openness and primary fiscal surpluses emerging from Figure 10.   
 
Also, it is important to stress that the positive correlation between financial openness and primary 
fiscal surpluses does not seem to be the result of a spurious relation due to the effects of financial 
integration on economic growth (and, therefore, tax revenues). Indeed, Figure 11 may suggest that 
there seems to be no relation between financial openness and growth, negative if anything. The 
empirical evidence emerging from Figure 11 is in turn consistent with Ostry et al., (2016), when they 
claim that “the impact of other flows [with respect to FDI] – such as portfolio investment and banking 
and especially hot, or speculative, debt inflows – seems neither to boost growth nor allow the country 
to better share risks with its trading partners” (Ostry et al.,  2016, p.39).  
 
 
Figure 11 – Financial openness and economic growth, selected developing and emerging economies 
 




According to Figures 10 and 11, the idea that bond vigilantes could actively act against fiscal 
dominance may find some ground in the data. Bond vigilantes would not necessarily represent bad 
news for the stability of EDE economies if they were to enforce the implementation of truly anti-
cyclical fiscal policies, i.e., fiscal surpluses in times of financial bonanza matched by fiscal deficits 
during recessions. Problems come when financial openness, together with recommendations from 
international financial institutions, establish a sort of “institutionalized” bias towards fiscal austerity, 
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Financial integration can more easily expose EDE countries to “global financial cycles”  and make the 
“autonomous” management of some leading macro variables harder. This is the case, for instance, of 
the exchange rate and of interest rates on EDE countries’ private and public bonds. Rey (2018) 
provides evidence that such macro prices are not determined by country-specific factors only and 
cannot be considered as reflecting country-specific idiosyncratic risks. On the contrary, they are 
strongly influenced by global factors and by period-contingent levels of liquidity and confidence 
characterizing global financial markets. Table 10 below offers a simple, perhaps superficial, but yet 
telling view of the role played by global financial cycles in the determination of FX and bonds’ interest 
rates in EDE countries. In column (a), Table 10 shows the coefficient of correlation between the VIX 
index, i.e., a standard measure of confidence in international financial markets, and the JP Morgan 
Emerging Markets Bond Index (EMBI) spread. In column (b), in turn, we report correlation with the 
spot FX rate versus the US Dollar24. We consider a selected group of EDE countries for which enough 
data are available. We use quarterly data from 2006Q1 to 2020Q2. We choose to rely upon this time 
span in order to remove the effects of past country-specific crises (ex: the Argentinian 2000-2002 debt 
crisis) from our data, and to better focus on the effects of global shocks (i.e., the 2007-2008 financial 
crisis and the Covid-19 shock) in the “periphery” of the world financial system.  
 
 
Table 10 – Coefficient of correlation between VIX index and: (a) JP Morgan Emerging Market Bond 
Index (EMBI) spread; (b) Local currency – US Dollar nominal exchange rate (FX). 2006Q1-2020Q2 
 
Country (a) VIX-EMBI correlation coefficient  
(2006Q1-2020Q2) 
(b) VIX-FX correlation coefficient  
(2006Q1-2020Q2) 
ARG 0.54 -0.02 
BRA 0.41 0.40 
CHL 0.74 0.75 
COL 0.76 0.78 
MEX 0.54 0.57 
PER 0.83 0.71 
CHN 0.30 0.39 
IND  - 0.18 
IDN 0.81 0.66 
MYL 0.68 0.62 
ZAF 0.56 0.60 
TUR 0.53 0.40 
RUS 0.67 0.32 





24 Quarterly FX data have been detrended by using a four-period moving average filter to better disentangle fluctuations 
possibly due to global financial factors from changes linked to longer-term country-specific factors in the evolution of the 
exchange rate itself.   
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Table 10 shows that there is a quite strong and positive correlation between the VIX index and EMBI’s 
spread. When international financial markets enter periods of higher volatility and stress (i.e., a higher 
VIX index), the risk premium EDE economies have to pay on international bonds may increase 
substantially. The same applies to the exchange rate. There is a positive association between higher 
(lower) values of the VIX index and positive (negative) deviations of the exchange rate from trend. 
Argentina is an exception, largely due to somehow country-specific dynamics of its own nominal 
exchange rate with respect to the US Dollar.25  
 
Interestingly, Table 10 may also suggest that countries that are relatively closed to international 
financial movements such as China and India might be better able to control and insulate the 
determination of such variables from external factors. In the end, our data tell us that there might be 
a positive correlation between the degree of financial integration characterizing an economy and the 
strength of the VIX-EMBI and VIX-FX relations26. Accordingly, it makes sense to wonder whether 
stricter capital controls should be considered by EDE countries as useful tools to “gain” (more) 
autonomous control over such relevant macroeconomic and financial “prices”.  
 
4.2.1 Financial integration and fiscal space in EDE countries: A focus on Latin 
America 
 
If we look at the six Latin American economies at the center of our study, we may formulate some 
conjectures about external constraints to fiscal expansions by confronting actual data about dollar -
denominated public bonds issued in international markets (as percentage of GDP) to past historical 
values (left axis). We also consider EMBI’s spread as indicator of perceived country riskiness (right 






25 Since 2006, after a period of substantial stability, the Argentinian peso has progressively depreciated with respect to the 
US Dollar according to a strong and clear exponential trend. This trend has emerged very clearly since 2017. It does not show 
any relevant fluctuation and does not seem to have been influenced by turbulences in international financial markets. 
Internal economic and geopolitical factors may have likely played a predomi nant role in the determination of the Argentinian 
exchange rate. 
26 Correlation coefficients between the average 2006-2020 Chinn-Ito index and the strength of VIX-EMBI – VIX-FX relations 
in the above set of countries are equal to 0.42 and 0.39, respectively.  
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Figure 12.a – Argentina: outstanding amount of external public bonds (as a percentage of GDP) and 
JP Morgan Emerging Market Bond Index (EMBI) spread, 1991 – 2020, yearly data 
 
    
 
Source: Authors’ computation on the basis of data from Bank of International Settlements, the IMF and World 
Bank. 
 
Figure 12.b – Brazil: outstanding amount of external public bonds (as a percentage of GDP) and JP 
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Figure 12.c – Mexico: outstanding amount of external public bonds (as a percentage of GDP) and JP 








Figure 12.d – Chile: outstanding amount of external public bonds (as a percentage of GDP) and JP 
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Figure 12.e – Colombia: outstanding amount of external public bonds (as a percentage of GDP) and 








Figure 12.f – Peru: outstanding amount of external public bonds (as a percentage of GDP) and JP 
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In general, the current outstanding value of external public bonds is low. With the partial exception 
of Argentina, external bond ratios are lower than (Brazil, Mexico, Chile and Peru) or close to 10 percent 
of GDP (see Colombia). From this point of view, it might be reasonable to believe that, at the moment, 
international financial markets will not set major restrictions to external funding and fiscal expansions 
in Latin America. This positive impression may be reinforced by emerging evidence according to which 
several Latin American governments have been capable to increase debt issuances denominated in 
local currencies, thus reducing exposure to exchange rate fluctuations (see Bertaut et al., 2020). Other 
factors, however, may suggest a more cautious approach. 
 
First, the amount of external public bond liabilities, although generally low, is increasing 27 and, in some 
cases, it is already close to or higher than those observed in the past before major financial/exchange 
rate crises. For instance, this is the case of Argentina (when compared to its position in 2000 and 
2001), Mexico (with respect to 1994), or Brazil (in comparison to 1998). This fact recalls us previous 
evidence about the so-called “debt intolerance” (Reinhart et al, 2003): EDE countries, Latin American 
ones among them, may find themselves cut off from international lending even at levels of external 
debt far lower than those observed in developed economies.  
 
Second, there is a twofold negative relation between the evolution of the exchange rate, exchange 
rate devaluations in particular, and the sustainability of external debt. On the one hand, the external 
debt burden, although currently low, can suddenly increase when depreciations occur due to currency 
mismatch between foreign currency denominated liabilities and tax revenues in domestic currency. 
On the other hand, FX devaluations may bear contractionary effects if they impair the balance sheets 
of domestic actors and cause large drop in investment that outstrip improved net exports (Bebczuk et 
al., 2010; Nalin and Yajima, 2020), and if they cut consumption by redistributing income away from 
wage earners (Taylor, 1991).28 Output falls obviously exacerbate external debt’s unsustainability by 
reducing tax revenues and increasing expenditures. In this sense, the spread of Covid-19 and sudden 
turbulences in international financial markets brought to sharp devaluations of most Latin American 
currencies with respect to the US dollar in the first part of 2020 (ECLAC, 2020). Local currencies 
recovered, at least partially, in the second half of 2020. Nonetheless, similar fluctuations in the future 
might endanger apparent safe external debt positions portrayed in Figures 12.a – 12.f29. 
 
27 There is a certain regional heterogeneity in the factors causing the recent rise in the external bond ratios. In Argentina, for 
instance, the external debt ratio slightly increased in 2020 even despite of negative net issuances and a substantial exclusion 
from international financial markets. The contraction in Argentinian GDP, together with increases in the cost of external 
finance and the depreciation of the exchange rate, were more than enough to (slightly) deteriorate Argentinian external 
debt position. Peru, Colombia, and Chile had much easier access to international financial markets. However, the cost of 
external borrowing is increasing, and this could set a limit to new issuances of external liabilities in the proximate future .   
28 Contractionary devaluations could also materialize as a consequence of restrictive stances taken by domestic monetary 
authorities in the attempt of preventing surges in imported inflation, and therefore in overall domestic inflation rate, via the 
exchange rate-domestic prices “pass-through” rule.  
29 The depreciation of local currencies and the increase in EMBI spread was particularly strong in March and April 2020, when 
the spread of Covid-19 clearly became a world issue and pandemic was officially declared by the World  Health Organization. 
The external macroeconomic environment partially returned to pre-crisis conditions in the second half of 2020, when the 
enormous amount of liquidity injected in financial markets by major central banks via extraordinary emergency -related 
quantitative easing measures also allowed EDE countries to receive abundant capital inflows. According to early empirical 
evidence provided by the Institute of International Finance (2020), EDE economies experienced the strongest increase in 
non-residential portfolio inflows since 2012Q1 in Q4 2020. In a way, these facts represent additional evidence of the 
exposure of EDE countries to external factors mostly determined in developed countries and in the center of the world 
financial system.      
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Third, following Bertaut et al., (2020), lower exposure to exchange rate volatility has been partially 
compensated by increasing instability in the provision of external finance by those foreign investors 
(mutual funds chiefly) that invested in local currency denominated public bonds. Other way around, 
whilst the exchange rate risk has moved to foreign lenders, domestic governments are now more 
exposed to abrupt cut-off in foreign funding. Carstens and Shin (2019) label these developments as 
“original sin redux”. In the end, what matters is not only the currency in which debt is denominated, 
but also who “owns” the debt. Large dependence on foreign capitals won’t enable Latin American 
countries to completely eradicate the “original sin”.     
 
Fourth, the safer stand apparently taken by the public sector in the 2000s is somehow compensated 
by more fragile financial positions of local non-financial corporations. These two opposite evolutions  
go hand-in-hand and need to be taken jointly. Since 2009, higher financial credibility enjoyed by local 
governments and lower country risks enabled corporations in EDE countries, Latin American among 
them, to get easier access to international financial markets. At the same time, non-financial 
corporations also took advantage of historically low interest rates and very abundant liquidity in the 
global financial system. The problem is that rising external indebtedness of non-financial corporations 
has not been mirrored by commensurate increases in real fixed investment perhaps aimed at 
expanding and diversifying exports. Quite the opposite, according to Chui et al. (2016), 
“microeconomic data suggest that many borrowers have increased foreign currency borrowing to 
finance local currency investments (notably in local property markets” (Chui et al., 2016, p.26). 
“Developments since 2010 throw doubt on the earlier consensus in Latin American studies that it is 
usually exporters who borrow more in foreign currency […] Companies producing non-tradables (e.g. 
property developers) have raised funds in dollar bond markets. Other borrowing was to finance 
increased production of oil and other primary commodities” (Chui et al., 2016, p.25). The increasing 
currency mismatch that characterizes the balance sheet of non-financial corporations in Latin America 
has economy-wide implications. On the one hand, it makes the financial position of non-financial 
corporations more vulnerable to external shocks. Increases in international interest rates, drops in 
international liquidity and exchange rate depreciations may cause widespread bankruptcies and 
throw the economy in a recession. On the other hand, it poses a tough policy dilemma to national 
government. If external shocks happen, they may leave private companies to their faith and bear the 
costs of (likely) painful economic contractions. Alternatively, national government may be tempted to 
step in and bail out private companies. This, however, will throw public budgets under strain and raise 
again the risk of sovereign debt crises thereafter. 
 
4.3 International capital flows, structural change and the role of 
(external) macroprudential policy   
 
Periods of large capital inflows in EDE countries have been usually described as following boom-and-
burst patterns. Frenkel and Rapetti (2009) stress how these episodes tend to present typical Minskyan 
features, albeit in a different way with respect to advanced economies. In their view, exogenous 
events such as changes in the domestic (macroeconomic) policy paradigm (say the move to trade 
liberalization, financial integration and neoliberal policies in the 1990s) or in the prevailing conditions 
in international financial markets (changes in FED’s monetary policy, for instance) are the main triggers 
of unstable phases of financial euphoria in EDE countries. This point by Frenkel and Rapetti (2009) has 
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many things in common with increasingly acknowledged exposure of EDE countries to global financial 
cycles (Rey, 2018) or “push” factors. 
 
The most recent and perhaps unusually long period of large capital inflows to EDE countries that 
started in the 2000s, and in the aftermath of the last financial crisis in particular, did not prompt any 
initial acceleration in the growth process of recipient economies, Latin American ones at least. If we 
look at the six Latin American economies considered so far, all of them actually experienced a decline 
in the average growth rate after the start of the episode with respect to mean growth in the three 
years before. This is quite a substantial difference with respect to the 1990s, during which financial 
booms effectively gave rise to remarkable but short-lived growth spells in all the six economies but 
Colombia30. To some extent, following Erten and Ocampo (2016), this might be the appreciable result 
of Latin American economies being more capable to tame finance-led macroeconomic instability 
thanks to the reconsideration and re-introduction of capital controls dismantled before.  
 
Despite an initial finance-led growth boom did not take place in the 2000s and the burst is yet to come, 
relevant similarities between the current episode of large capital inflows and the previous ones are 
still worth noticing. First, current financial (and economic) dynamics continue to be strongly influenced 
by external factors. After 2008, abundant liquidity from central banks in advanced economies via 
repeated rounds of quantitative easing and the drop in international interest rates significantly 
contributed to originate the surge in international capital. This view is reinforced by financial flights 
observed in 2020. On the one hand, the outbreak of the pandemic and the increase in perceived global 
risk explain most of the deepest post-2008 reversal in capital flows and peak in JP Morgan EMBI 
experienced by Latin American and other EDE countries in the first quarter of 2020 (IIF, 2020a and 
2020b; ECLAC, 2021b). On the other hand, bold reactions by leading monetary institutions helped to 
ease external financial constraints to “peripheral” countries (read a downward swing in the EMBI) in 
the second half of the last year, and to resuscitate capital inflows, although on a relatively weak basis, 
in Latin America in particular, with respect to the post-2008/2009 rebound (IIF, 2020a and 2020b). 
Second, Following Chui et al., (2016) and Perez-Caldentey et al., (2019), Latin American and other EDE 
countries non-financial corporations have taken advantage of enduring favorable international 
financial conditions to raise cheap external funds in foreign currency. In doing this, however, their 
balance sheet has become more vulnerable to currency mismatch and exchange rate fluctuations 
(read depreciations). In Latin America, non-financial corporations have increasingly moved towards 
fragile speculative or “Ponzi” financial positions (see Perez -Caldentey et al., (2019)). In the end, 
stability may continue to breed instability, very much in line with Minsky.  
 
Finance-led instability, together with possible perverse sectorial effects of large capital inflows, bring 
capital controls and (external) macroprudential policy back to the center of the economic debate. 
Indeed, mainstream economic theory has made a quite remarkable U-turn in its view about capital 
flows management (CFM) measures. Since the 1970s up to the 1990s, there was widespread 
consensus about the virtues of financial integration, and about economic and efficiency gains that 
 
30 A very preliminary analysis of growth dynamics in the 2000s for the six Latin American economies at stake reveals that 
they all scored negative values in the difference between average real GDP growth rate during the last recorded period of 
large capital inflows (see Table A.4) and average growth in the three years before the start of the episode. Data are as follows: 
Argentina (-4.58); Brazil (-0.45); Chile (-2.68); Colombia (-1.96); Mexico (-1.50); Peru (-1.38). When we look back to the 1990s, 
the picture is almost opposite: Argentina (+9.37); Brazil (+2.85); Chile (+0.31); Colombia (-2.04); Mexico (+1.75); Peru (+4.94).     
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could be reaped by lifting restrictions to capital mobility. Since the beginning of the 2000s, and even 
the more so after the 2007-2008 financial crash, several mainstream economists reconsidered the 
usefulness of regulatory and/or market-based limits to unfettered capital flows (Klein, 2012). In a 
similar vein, the literature trying to empirically assess the effectiveness of these measures have been 
flourishing in the last decade or so. 
 
Ostry et al., (2012) provide a useful classification of the various instruments available in the CFM 
toolkit. For instance, they distinguish between capital (inflow) controls and “external” FX-related 
macroprudential policies. The first type of measures looks at residency of actors as “discrimination” 
criteria for limiting financial transactions between them. External FX-related macroprudential 
regulation, instead, may restrict the accumulation of certain financial assets or liabilities depending 
on the currency they are denominated in whatever is the residency of actors involved. The two set of 
policies, although conceptually different, may de facto overlap each other as to the goals the pursue 
(ex: reducing financial instability caused by external borrowing in foreign currency); in the variables 
they influence (ex: the exchange rate and foreign indebtedness); in the phenomena they try to control 
(ex: domestic credit booms fueled by foreign capitals)31. Similar overlaps also exist between capital 
controls and the broader range of internal macroprudential measures (Rey, 2018) to the extent that 
limits to, say, domestic lending may eventually dampen foreign borrowing.  
 
The empirical evidence about the effectiveness of these measures is mixed. Klein (2012), for instance, 
tend to downgrade the role of CFMs. In his view, neither long-standing capital controls (“walls”) nor 
episodic restrictions (“gates”) seem to have relevant effects on domestic financial variables, although 
they may reduce surges in gross capital inflows. Other contributions, however, present quite opposite 
results. Ostry et al., (2012), for instance, find that capital controls and FX-related macroprudential 
measures do not change the overall amount of gross capital inflows. Nonetheless, they modify their 
composition away from debt instruments (and towards equities) and reduce the relevance of FX-
denominated credit in domestic lending. Both facts are taken as evidence of strengthened financial 
solidity. Forbes et al., (2015) reach similar conclusions. In their study, capital controls and external 
macroprudential policies do not seem to prevent in a significant and consistent way surges in capital 
inflows and exchange rate appreciations. Yet, they may tame domestic credit booms and reduce 
domestic financial fragility (as captured by increases in domestic banks’ leverage and credit provision). 
Ahnert et al., (2021) note that FX-related macroprudential policies tend to reduce financial sector and 
aggregate economy-wide exposure to exchange rate risk, even though this is partially moved to the 
non-financial corporate sector. Erten and Ocampo (2016), finally, claim that, once the problem of 
endogeneity is properly considered in econometric analyses32, then capital controls and external 
macroprudential policy stand out as effective measures against sources of macroeconomic instability, 
namely appreciation of the real exchange rate and foreign currency “pressures”33. 
 
31 See Mendoza and Terrones (2008), among many others, about the strong association between capital inflows and credit 
booms in EDE economies in particular.  
32 Indeed, whilst capital controls and external macroprudential policies may influence capital inflow s, they often emerge as 
endogenous policy responses to surges in foreign capitals themselves. Neglecting this endogeneity issue might generate a 
downward bias in the estimated effects of the former over the latter.    
33 Erten and Ocampo (2016) measure fore ign exchange “pressures” as a weighted average of real exchange rate 
appreciations and accumulation of foreign reserves. In their view, this could capture the extent by which domestic monetary 
institutions might have to intervene in financial markets to manage the “external channel” of money creation and its 
implications in terms of exchange rate and inflation dynamics, as well as liquidity expansion.  
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This report does not aim at contributing to such an empirical debate. The provision of new empirical 
evidence about the relation between capital controls, external macroprudential policy, and 
macroeconomic and financial instability goes well beyond our goals. Nonetheless, we want to spot 
two ways through which, from a theoretical point of view, external macroprudential policy may also 
address the long-term sectorial consequences of periods of large capital inflows. 
 
1) External macroprudential policy, foreign reserves and monetary policy independence: Since the 
beginning of the 2000s, increasing concern about foreign capital-led appreciations in the nominal 
and real exchange rate has led EDE countries to accumulate large amounts of foreign reserves. 
Monetary institutions in Latin American countries do not make an exception despite they switched 
to more flexible (free floating or managed) exchange rate regimes than in the 1990s. Figure 13 
below documents the unprecedent increase in the stock of foreign reserves (as a percentage of 
total external debt) held by Latin American countries in the 2000s.  
 
Figure 13 – Stock of foreign reserves (as percentage of total external debt), Latin America,  




Source: World Bank 
 
 
Large stock of foreign reserves can certainly enable EDE countries to better control the exchange 
rate, in particular to prevent exchange rate crises during periods of financial turbulences. 
Nonetheless, they may imply non negligible implicit or explicit costs. First, following Akyüz (2021), 
there is a negative income transfer from EDE countries to developed ones due to differences in 
the yields on their respective foreign investments. Whilst foreign reserves of EDE countries are 
usually invested in low-yield safe assets issued by developed countries (US Treasury bonds or bills, 
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for instance), investors from developed countries purchase much more remunerative liabilities of 
EDE countries. Second, the accumulation of foreign reserves comes with intrinsic contradictions. 
When accumulating foreign reserves, domestic monetary authorities expand domestic liquidity. 
Despite the nominal exchange rate may be under control and appreciations avoided, domestic 
inflation may accelerate and lead, in one way or the other, to uncompetitive real exchange rates. 
The accumulation of foreign reserves may reduce financial instability but may be quite ineffective 
in avoiding the crowing out of non-traditional tradable sectors that could originate from real 
exchange rate appreciations. Alternatively, central banks in EDE countries may sterilize the extra 
liquidity created via the external channel by selling domestic bonds in open market operations. 
This way, however, yields on domestic public bonds will increase and the space for active 
expansionary fiscal policy narrow. Possible constraints to fiscal policy become even more 
worrisome in the present context in which expansionary fiscal measures, public investment in 
particular, may play a leading role in feeding transformative post-Covid recovery. 
 
External macroprudential policies that discourage external borrowing in foreign currency may be 
very useful tools to reduce the “subtle” costs of large holdings of foreign reserves. Consistent with 
Erten and Ocampo (2016), they may weaken pressures on the appreciation of the nominal (and 
therefore real) exchange rate. This will in turn allow domestic monetary authorities to take milder 
positions in the FX market, to reduce average holding of foreign reserves, and to avoid the 
adoption of sterilization measures. Following Rey (2018), all this may permit domestic monetary 
policy to become more independent from global financial cycles. 
This is even the more so if external macroprudential policies also enable EDE economies to more 
easily adopt managed exchange rate regimes by lowering the scale of international capital flows. 
Indeed, managed exchange rate regimes seem to perform better than fixed and free-floating ones 
in reducing the sensitivity of domestic credit and housing prices to global financial shocks (see 
Obstfeld et al., 2018), hence strengthening financial stability. In a similar vein, managed exchange 
rate regimes may soften the “original sin redux” and dwindle foreign investors’ reactions to swings 
in the exchange rate (Hofmann et al., 2021) by dampening exchange rate volatility itself. In the 
end, once reduced the vulnerability to global financial shocks, domestic monetary authorities may 
gain wider margins of maneuver for pursuing “developmentalist” goals. National strategies for 
post-Covid sustainable recovery, in particular, could contemplate more independent monetary 
policies that more easily accommodate the implementation of ambitious publicly financed 
recovery plans putting emphasis on public investment, public (social and physical) infrastructures 
and, eventually, structural change. 
 
2) Sector-specific external macroprudential policy: Whilst point 1 somehow refers to the “pure” 
macroeconomic implications of external macroprudential policies, the designing of such measures 
should also take explicitly onboard the sectorial effects of large capital inflows. Other way around, 
regulatory or market-based restrictions to financial integration should pay attention to which 
sectors are mostly affected by inflows of foreign funds, either directly via foreign investors’ 
purchases of home securities or intermediated by the domestic financial system.  
From the point of view of productive development, it makes a difference whether foreign funds 
fuel housing booms in the domestic real estate, whether they finance the expansion of the 
domestic service industry, or whether support productive investment in the non-traditional (say, 
non-natural resource) tradable sector. Consistent with this view, external macroprudential 
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policies should impose restrictions to foreign capitals that differ from sector to sector. Consider 
(non-interest bearing) deposit requirements or direct taxes levied on foreign borrowing, for 
instance. On the one hand, these measures should become tighter when foreign debt is 
denominated in foreign currency. On the other hand, they should foresee and apply tougher 
“penalty” rates on foreign borrowing by corporations in the non-tradable sector with respect to 
companies in the non-traditional tradable one. In a similar fashion, given foreign currency-
denominated debt of the domestic banking system, macroprudential policy should discriminate 
against credit to non-tradable industries and favor banks’ loans to activities that are capable to 
generate “hard currency” revenues. 
 
The purpose of sector-specific differential external macroprudential measures is twofold. First, 
consistent with the primary goal of broader macroprudential regulation, additional restrictions 
imposed at sectorial level may further concur to reduce economy-wide currency mismatches and 
tame financial instability when perceived global risk and exchange rate volatility increase. Second, 
they go beyond avoiding excessive external borrowing, and try to influence the allocation of 
collected funds with the aim of creating a more diversified technologically advanced productive 
system with stronger export capacity. On the one hand, by doing this, industry-specific measures 
explicitly tackle and try to counteract the perverse squeeze in tradable activities that large capital 
inflows may prompt via Dutch disease-like mechanisms. On the other hand, they recognize and 
try to embed in concrete policy actions the fact that the accumulation of technological knowledge 
and the diversification of the productive system may be the ultimate necessary conditions for 
macroeconomic stability (Chang and Lebdioui, 2020). It is perhaps not by chance that , from an 
historical point of view, higher export orientation and more advanced industrialization in East Asia 
than in Latin American made the former mostly immune to external debt crisis in the 1980s (Sachs, 
1985) and quicker in post-crisis recoveries thereafter. The latter, instead, was at the epicenter of 
the crash in 1982 and has continued to suffer from more acute recurrent financial and economic 
instability since then. 
 
Given these general guidelines, Table 11 offers a list of possible policy measures pursuing the two 
main goals mentioned above. We first recommend the implementation of quantitative limits to 
external borrowing that should be applied horizontally throughout the entire economy. They could 
take the form of ceilings imposed to firms’ external debt-own fund ratios or to the debt service ratio 
(as a percentage of profits). Such limits are meant to avoid speculative/Ponzi financial positions to 
emerge at firm level and unstable Minskyan cycles to unfold at macro level. In doing so, they may 
contribute to reduce “foreign currency pressures” and provide domestic institutions with more leeway 
in the control of the exchange rate, the management of foreign reserves and the implementation of 
monetary policy.  
 
The design of quantitative limits to international borrowing should adopt a broad definition of external 
debt. They should obviously discourage the (excessive) issuance of foreign currency-denominated 
corporate bonds. Nonetheless, they should also target bonds denominated in domestic currency and 
purchased by international lenders. Indeed, both types of transactions and the connected capital 
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inflows can cause the appreciation of the exchange rate and Dutch disease-like phenomena34. On top 
of this, such a comprehensive definition may help to address the “original sin redux”: who owns the 
debt, foreign or domestic creditors, also matters as much as the currency of denomination does. 
 
34  In the case of foreign currency-denominated bonds, “foreign currency pressures” may materialize ex-post when domestic 
borrowers try to convert foreign currency into the domestic one. In the case of domestic currency -denominated bonds, such 
pressures may emerge ex-ante when foreign creditors purchase domestic currency in the FX market in order to then 
purchase assets denominated in that same currency.  
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Table 11 – Economy-wide and sector-specific capital control and external macroprudential policy measures 
 
ECONOMY-WIDE HORIZONTAL MEASUES 
MEASURE TARGET VARIABLE MAIN PURPOSE 
Quantitative limits to external 
borrowing 
External debt/own fund ratio  1. Tame Minskyan cycles 
Debt service ratio 2. Reduce "foreign currency pressure" 
  3. Create more leeway for FX control and autonomous monetary policy 
SECTOR-SPECIFIC MEASURES 
MEASURE TARGET VARIABLE MAIN PURPOSE 
Sector-specific reserve requirements 
on foreign borrowing 
Relative costs of foreign borrowing 1. Contrast Dutch disease effects of capital inflows 
2. Direct external funding towards non-traditional tradable sectors 
3. Discourage overexpansion of non-tradable sectors 
4. Reduce currency mismatch 
Sector-specific taxation of portfolio 
capital inflows 
Financial returns/capital gains 1. Squeeze returns/capital gains on short-term investment  
2. Tame stock exchange/real estate bubbles 
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Quantitative limits to external debt should pay attention to the residency of the actors involved in 
financial transactions (rather than their nationality). This criterion aims at impeding legal practices 
that may enable counterparts to circumvent capital restrictions. For instance, quantitative limits 
should apply to, say, “internal” transactions between domestic branches and off-shore subsidiaries of 
a company that may have been set with the (hidden) purpose of escaping capital controls. By the same 
token, they should be levied upon local subsidiaries of foreign companies that may collect foreign 
funds via their headquarters and subsequently intermediate them in the domestic economy.  
 
Restrictions to external funding should be better conceived as permanent “walls” rather than 
temporary “gates” so as to avoid untimely implementations due to the complex identification of 
upswing and downswing phases in financial cycles. Given a permanent base, “walls” can nevertheless 
be progressively raised whenever factors causing surges in capital inflows become more prominent. 
According to the literature about global financial cycles, policy makers in EDE countries should 
primarily pay attention to global push factors. It is time for tougher quantitative restrictions to foreign 
debt when foreign monetary policy becomes strongly expansionary, unconventional monetary 
measures are at work and/or liquidity overflows in the center of the global financial system. A large 
and widening positive gap between the domestic policy rate and that prevailing in international 
markets or the VIX index constitute natural indicators policy makers may look at in order to determine 
updates in quantitative limits to foreign borrowing. 
 
The second set of measures reported in Table 11 are meant to explicitly and directly address the long-
term productive and sectorial implications of periods of large capital inflows. The general goal here is 
to channel external funds, when admitted according to economy-wide quantitative restrictions, to 
those sectors that can generate “hard currency” revenues by exporting non-traditional tradable goods 
and services, rather than non-tradable sectors whose foreign indebtedness is source of currency 
mismatch. For instance, these measures may try to tame bubbles in the real estate that are fueled by 
foreign capitals, whilst favoring investment in new activities producing tradable goods and services.  
 
The measures at stake are complementary to the quantitative limits we have just discussed. Given 
their goals, they should be modulated according to different levels of tightness and intensity among 
different sectors. In Table 11, we suggest the adoption of sector-specific reserve requirements on 
foreign borrowing that implicitly increase the relative costs of foreign borrowing (with respect to 
internal borrowing), and even the more so in the case of non-tradable sectors. Measures at sectoral 
level may also include the imposition of differentiated tax rates on returns to short-term portfolio 
investment. More specifically, we think about the taxation of capital gains on investment in equities 
that may fuel bubbles in the financial sector or, again, in the real estate. Following Taylor (1991), this 
is far from being an unknown event in the history of EDE countries, in particular in the aftermath of 
the privatization of strategic state-owned companies. These measures may contribute to “neutralize” 
possible destabilizing feedbacks between asset price inflation and debt accumulation (Taylor and 
Rada, 2008), and reduce, at least partially, the long-term (productive) distortions that even temporary 
episodes of financial frenzy may bring about. 
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5. Conclusions                                 
 
In this report, we document the perverse effects that non-FDI net capital inflows may bring about 
long-run productive development. More specifically, by taking inspiration from a previous study by 
Rodrik (2016), we provide empirical evidence according to which large capital inflows may be source 
of premature de-industrialization and technological backwardness by exacerbating (anticipating) the 
relative squeeze of manufacturing and by reducing the degree of complexity of domestic productive 
systems. We show that these phenomena are particularly acute and more worrisome in the case of 
emerging and developing (EDE) economies with respect to developed countries. In this general 
picture, we also notice that heterogeneity exists among EDE countries themselves. Premature de-
industrialization is far ahead on its way and the detrimental effects of large capital inflows appear 
significantly stronger in Latin America than Asia. 
 
The economic effects of Covid-19 seem to be particular harsh in EDE countries characterized by 
reduced space for expansionary fiscal policies and relatively weak, poorly diversified productive 
structures that largely depend on natural resource exports, participate to low-skill intensive stages of 
global value chains, and did not develop high-skill intensive tradable services in the last decades. 
 
In light of this evidence, any national strategy for post-Covid sustained and sustainable recovery 
should put structural change and productive development at the core of its agenda. Given the long -
lasting scars that the pandemic will likely leave in the balance sheet of both households and private 
business (read lower income and higher debt stocks), it is reasonable to expect publicly financed large 
public investment plans to take the lead in feeding economic recovery. Once again, however, financial 
integration may significantly constrain the viability of such plans by reducing the space for 
expansionary fiscal measures. 
 
All these considerations may strengthen and spread even further increasing recognition by economic 
literature that capital flow management measures (CFMs), i.e., capital controls and external 
macroprudential policies, may contribute to improve the economic performance and financial stability 
of EDE economies. More than that, we stress that positive effects of CFMs may go well beyond 
increased resilience to global financial shocks. Indeed, external macroprudential policies may also 
bear positive consequences for the long-run development trajectory of EDE economies by 
counteracting perverse Dutch disease-like phenomena triggered off by large non-FDI net capital 
inflows. External macroprudential measures may do this by enabling EDE economies to reduce the 
implicit costs of large foreign reserves’ holdings, to more easily adopt managed exchange rate 
regimes, and by increasing the degree of independence of domestic monetary policy from global 
financial cycles. Policy makers could magnify these desirable effects of external macroprudential 
measures by designing them with sector-specific differential restrictions and opportunities. External 
macroprudential measures should limit excessive external borrowing, but they should also prompt a 
“virtuous” allocation of funds towards the non-traditional export-generating tradable sector and away 
from non-tradable activities.                 
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7. Appendix  
 
Table A.1 – List of countries included in the regression analysis 
 
COUNTRY COUNTRY CODE SUB-SAMPLE 
Argentina ARG Emerging and developing (EDE) 
Bolivia BOL Emerging and developing (EDE) 
Botswana BWA Emerging and developing (EDE) 
Brazil BRA Emerging and developing (EDE) 
Chile CHL Emerging and developing (EDE) 
China CHN Emerging and developing (EDE) 
Colombia COL Emerging and developing (EDE) 
Costa Rica CRI Emerging and developing (EDE) 
Denmark DNK Developed 
Egypt EGY Emerging and developing (EDE) 
France FRA Developed 
Ghana GHA Emerging and developing (EDE) 
Honk Kong HKG Emerging and developing (EDE) 
India IND Emerging and developing (EDE) 
Indonesia IDN Emerging and developing (EDE) 
Italy ITA Developed 
Japan JPN Developed 
Kenya KEN Emerging and developing (EDE) 
Malaysia MYS Emerging and developing (EDE) 
Mauritius MUS Emerging and developing (EDE) 
Mexico MEX Emerging and developing (EDE) 
Nigeria NGA Emerging and developing (EDE) 
Netherlands NLD Developed 
Philippines PHL Emerging and developing (EDE) 
Peru PER Emerging and developing (EDE) 
Senegal SEN Emerging and developing (EDE) 
Singapore SGP Developed 
South Korea KOR Emerging and developing (EDE) 
South Africa ZAF Emerging and developing (EDE) 
Spain ESP Developed 
Sweden SWE Developed 
Tanzania TZA Emerging and developing (EDE) 
Thailand THA Emerging and developing (EDE) 
Venezuela, RB VEN Emerging and developing (EDE) 
United Kingdom GBR Developed 
United States USA Developed 
 




Table A.2 – Data source and descriptive statistics, full country sample 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
SOURCE LABELS N mean sd max min 
       
IMF (IFS) and Cepalstat Non-FDI net capital inflows 940 4.602 8.630 146.4 -19.64 
IMF (IFS) and Cepalstat Financial dummy 940 
    
GGDC Manufacturing Employment Share 1,296 13.62 6.019 41.20 1.231 
GGDC Manufacturing Nominal Value Added 1,287 19.78 6.948 38.00 1.070 
GGDC Manufacturing Real Value Added 1,283 17.52 6.439 32.49 1.087 
Atlas of Economic Complexity Economic Complexity Index (ECI) 1,290 56.01 19.42 100 0.501 
GGDC Population 1,296 116,657 256,320 1.380e+06 1,340 
GGDC Population, squared 1,296 7.926e+10 3.074e+11 1.905e+12 1.795e+06 
GGDC GDP per capita 1,296 14,757 13,097 67,331 699.2 
GGDC GDP per capita, squared 1,296 3.892e+08 6.058e+08 4.533e+09 488,919 
WB Trade openness index 1,255 71.90 71.70 442.6 6.320 
WB ROW GDP growth rate 1,252 5.769 5.409 24.66 -6.990 
WB Total natural resources rents (% of GDP) 1,287 5.050 6.252 37.29 0.000311 
       
Number of years  1980-2017 1980-2017 1980-2017 1980-2017 1980-2017 
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Table A.3 – Econometric tests for autocorrelation, heteroskedaticity and panel data cross-sectional dependence 
 















      
Woolridge test for serial 
correlation 
H0: no first-order 
autocorrelation 
Prob > F = 0.0000 
(rejected) 
Prob > F = 0.0000 
(rejected) 
Prob > F = 0.0000 
(rejected) 
Prob > F = 0.0000 
(rejected) 
      
LR Maximum likelihood 
Test for 
Heteroskedasticity 
H0: no heteroskedasticity Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
(rejected) 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
(rejected) 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
(rejected) 
Prob > chi2 = 1.0000 (not 
rejected) 
      
Modified Wald statistic for 
groupwise 
heteroskedasticity 
H0: no groupwise 
heteroskedasticity 
Prob>chi2 = 0.0000 
(rejected) 
Prob>chi2 = 0.0000 
(rejected) 
Prob>chi2 = 0.0000 
(rejected) 
Prob>chi2 = 0.0000 
(rejected) 
      
Pearson test for Cross-
sectional 
dependence 
H0: no cross-sectional 
dependence 
Pr = 0.475               
(not rejected) 
Pr = 0.466               
(not rejected) 
Pr = 0.466               
(not rejected) 
Pr = 0.485               
(not rejected) 
      
      
 
Note: Test interpretation in parentheses 
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CODE COUNTRY TIME SPAN 
EPISODE 
NUMBER 
CODE COUNTRY TIME SPAN 
 
1 ARG Argentina 1980 - 1981 31 JPN Japan 2014 - 2017  
2 ARG Argentina 1991 - 1998 32 KEN Kenya 2012 - 2016  
3 ARG Argentina 2006 - 2012 33 MEX Mexico 1990 - 1994  
4 BOL Bolivia 1992 - 1994 34 MEX Mexico 2007 - 2017  
5 BOL Bolivia 1996 - 1998 35 MYS Malaysia 2009 - 2013  
6 BOL Bolivia 2001 - 2005 36 NLD Netherlands 1997 - 2006  
7 BOL Bolivia 2008 - 2017 37 NGA Nigeria 2005 - 2015  
8 BWA Botswana 2001 - 2003 38 PER Peru 1994 - 1997  
9 BWA Botswana 2006 - 2009 39 PER Peru 2002 - 2007  
10 BRA Brazil 1991 - 1998 40 PER Peru 2010 - 2017  
11 BRA Brazil 2005 - 2015 41 PHL Philippines 1992 - 1995  
12 CHL Chile 1980 - 1982 42 PHL Philippines 2002 - 2006  
13 CHL Chile 1992 - 1994 43 SEN Senegal 2013 - 2015  
14 CHL Chile 1997 - 2014 44 SGP Singapore 1993 - 1996  
15 CHN China 2000 - 2002 45 SGP Singapore 2001 - 2007  
16 CHN China 2005 - 2007 46 KOR South Korea 1994 - 1996  
17 COL Colombia 1980 - 1985 47 KOR South Korea 2001 - 2007  
18 COL Colombia 1994 - 2001 48 KOR South Korea 2010 - 2014  
19 COL Colombia 2009 - 2017 49 SWE Sweden 1995 - 2011  
20 CRI Costa Rica 2002 - 2008 50 ZAF South Africa 1994 - 2000  
21 CRI Costa Rica 2010 - 2017 51 ZAF South Africa 2004 - 2007  
22 DNK Denmark 1999 - 2010 52 ZAF South Africa 2009 - 2014  
23 FRA France 1998 - 2009 53 ESP Spain 1998 - 2007  
24 IDN Indonesia 1993 - 1996 54 THA Thailand 1993 - 1997  
25 IDN Indonesia 2005 - 2013 55 THA Thailand 2005 - 2007  
26 IND India 2001 - 2005 56 GBR United Kingdom 1995 - 2001  
27 IND India 2009 - 2014 57 GBR United Kingdom 2003 - 2007  
28 ITA Italy 1994 - 2000 58 USA United States 1995 - 2007  
29 ITA Italy 2003 - 2006 59 VEN Venezuela 1990 - 1994  
30 JPN Japan 2004 - 2007 60 VEN Venezuela 1997 - 2011  
 

































2018 0.29 0.60 3.51 
 
Costa Rica CRI 
1990-


































2018 0.31 -2.20 0.40 
 
Latin America Chinn-Ito index  0.63      
Bangladesh BGD 
1990-
2018 0.17 -0.93 5.70 
 
Sri Lanka LKA 
1990-




























2018 0.15 -1.03 9.45 
 












2018 0.54 -2.94 7.61 
 
South-East Asia Chinn-Ito index 0.31      
Pakistan PAK 
1993-












2018 0.70 1.73 4.46 
 
South Africa ZAF 
2000-




































2018 0.17 -0.70 5.34 
 
Other emerging economies Chinn-
Ito index 
0.26 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
